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Abstract 
This paper analyses business strategies to survive the economic crisis of late socialism in 
Yugoslavia. It takes one of Yugoslavia’s flagship exporter enterprises, the shipyard “Uljanik” in 
Pula as a case study. It argues that the most widespread response to growing economic difficulties 
in the 1970s and 1980s was a strategy of muddling-through. Yugoslavia, while aiming to become 
an exporter of industrial goods, never actually managed to adapt its domestic economic institutions 
to that goal. “Uljanik”, like the other shipbuilders in Yugoslavia, produced mostly for export yet 
failed to earn profits. Domestic conditions and the political over-determination of industry 
prevented the implementation of measures to increase efficiency. “Uljanik”, for example, expanded 
capacity and hired new workers even at a time when the global demand for ships was depressed 
after the 1974 oil-price shock. Employment and other social functions turned out to be more salient 
than any business rationale. Since the mid-1970s this made “Uljanik” dependent on customers, such 
as the Soviet Union or Third World countries that did not pay in hard currency, or did not pay at 
all. Frequent illiquidity was the consequence. The paper present the ship-building industry as a case 
in point for the increasing tensions between Yugoslavia’s institutional set-up and its integration in 
the international economy, and for the unwillingness of policy-makers to affect structural change. 
The country failed to build resilience for mediating the outfall of global economic crisis. 
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Introduction 
In October 1990, the Uljanik shipyard in the town of Pula (Croatia/Yugoslavia) 
commissioned the international consulting firm PriceWaterhouse to help drawing up a 
strategic plan for the forthcoming years. The plan outlined measures to increase profitability 
based on a candid analysis of the status quo. “Until recently, our main objectives were 
employment and social security, whereas profitability was secondary.”1 PriceWaterhouse’s 
SWOT analysis of Uljanik consisted of many weaknesses and few strengths.2 Actually, the 
consultants managed to identify only five advantages of the shipyard: long experience in the 
building of special-purpose ships, good reputation for the quality of the vessels, convenient 
location (weather-wise), “strong informal relations”, and the “willingness of the government 
to support shipbuilding”. The much longer list of weaknesses pictured an enterprise, which 
lacked organization and purpose, never delivered ships on time, worked with outdated 
technology and machinery, had no marketing to speak of, did poor accounting, suffered from 
low labor discipline and high overhead costs, did not care for work safety, had little money 
and produced high losses. In a word: the consultancy’s assessment confirmed all suspicions 
that one might have from a typically socialist enterprise of that time – but not necessarily 
from a firm that produced for the world market and enjoyed name recognition; so, how can a 
firm be both sides of this coin at the same time? 
PriceWaterhouse suggested that in the future the shipyard should focus its business on 
earning money. This was certainly a good idea but easier said than done, as became clear almost 
30 years later. At the time of writing (end of 2019) the shipyard stands idle because a regional 
court has opened bankruptcy procedures in May 2019, after it had turned out that the firm was 
illiquid and in deep debt. Since the beginning of 2018, work on unfinished ships had all but 
ceased because the shipyard could pay neither its workers nor its suppliers. The increasingly 
desperate search for a “strategic investor” has so far yielded no results, not least because the 
costs of getting the shipyard going again were increasing by the day. 
Local newspapers, usually sympathetic to the shipyard, started to present “Uljanik” as an 
remnant of socialism, which suffered from its legacy of mis-management. While this would be 
a gross simplification, it is true that today’s problems of the shipyard have their roots in the 
past: this paper argues that they have to be located in the 1970s. The 1970s are often described 
 
1 “Uljanik Brodogradilište Strateški plan, 1991.–1996”. Transl. from the English original “Uljanik Shipyard 
Strategic Plan for 1991–1996”, PriceWaterhouse/IKO, May 1991, in: Archive of the (former) Croatian Funds for 
Privatization (HFP), p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p. 16A–17A. 
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as the “golden age” of Yugoslav socialism when livings standards and incomes were rising and 
people enjoyed a decently good life.3 Yet, this was also a time of momentous shifts in the way 
how the Yugoslav economy operated because of two major developments, which per se were 
unrelated: on the one hand, the constitutional reforms of 1974 substantially transformed the 
way how business was organized (or dis-organized) and to which extent the state supported it 
or not. On the other hand, the oil price shock and the ensuing recession in the West changed the 
international economic environment, into which the Yugoslavs had increasingly integrated 
themselves since the 1950s. The conjuncture of these two developments stimulated responses 
by economic organizations which in the long term produced new problems, while at the same 
time creating state-business ties that would survive the end of communist rule and greatly 
deflect the post-socialist vector of economic reform. Firms such as Uljanik learnt survival 
techniques in the 1970s and 1980s that came handy in the difficult 1990s, but ultimately 
prevented them from becoming resilient enough to withstand global competition once the 
government stopped acting as a shield. 
While this full story is yet untold, this paper has a narrower focus: the question it asks is how – 
despite all odds – “Uljanik” managed to survive the last decade of socialism even though its 
business case became increasingly unviable in the 1980s. This is linked to the larger question of 
the economic – and political – outfall of Yugoslavia’s export orientation. The contradictions 
between self-managed socialism and integration into the international division of labor were not 
immediately obvious. Yet, for a company, which almost exclusively produced for export, they 
were. Uljanik and Yugoslav shipbuilding in general represent, on the one hand, an idiosyncratic 
industry because no other sector of Yugoslavia’s industry depended so much on foreign customers 
as this one (in the 1970s, about 90 percent of the Yugoslav built tonnage went abroad). On the 
other hand, idiosyncrasy can make things clearer: in shipbuilding, important structural problems 
of the Yugoslav economy crystallized earlier than elsewhere because of its direct exposure to the 
world market.4 
The specific problems of this industry in the 1970s manifested unintended consequences of 
the earlier decision of Yugoslav policy makers (in the late 1950s and 60s) to seek increased 
integration into the global economy whose rules were mainly set by capitalist powers. The basic 
conundrum was the question how to pacify the requirements of the market with the premises of 
 
3 Also other autors stress that behind full shop windows, the economy began to fall apart in the 1970s: Marie-
Janine Calic: “The Beginning of the End. The 1970s as a Historical Turning Point in Yugoslavia”, in: Marie-Janine 
Calic, Dietmar Neutatz, Julia Obertreis (eds.): The crisis of socialist modernity. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
in the 1970s. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011, p. 66–86. 
4 On these contradictions and Yugoslavia’s economic policy making in that period more generally see especially 
Vladimir Unkovski-Korica: The economic struggle for power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. From World War II to non-
alignment. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016. 
Building Ships and Surviving Late Socialism 
 
 3 
self-managed socialism. Very similar to the famous Gastarbeiter migration from Yugoslavia – 
another major process of integrating Yugoslavia into the international division of labor –, it 
appears that participation in the world economy, while alleviating some problems on the short 
term, only helped to make the shortcomings of Yugoslavia’s self-managed socialism more 
evident and to intensify its inherent contradictions.5 Shipbuilding was affected by these trends 
already in the 1970s which meant that it entered the even more difficult 1980s, when the whole 
Yugoslav economy declined, in an already pretty poor shape. 
Some of these developments must have puzzled the Yugoslavs. Their shipbuilders, while 
embracing the international market and exploring a language of competitiveness, were forced 
to learn capitalist double-speak the hard way. After 1974, when Yugoslavia embarked on 
dismantling the state and reducing the government’s economic role in favor of self-
management, West European and especially East Asian countries massively subsidized their 
shipbuilders. It was thanks to state support that many of them managed to wither the outfall of 
the 1974 oil shock, which led to a lasting drop in the global demand for new ships.6 The 
geography of “soft budgetary constraints” can sometimes shift. 7  Actually, to “soften” 
constraints by lobbying the government was one of the paramount purposes of the association 
of large shipbuilders in Yugoslavia, the opaque Poslovna Zajednica (PZ) “Jadranbrod”. Its 
main function was to help finding a solution for the financing difficulties of shipbuilding, to 
coordinate the operations of the shipbuilders and to act as their representative vis-à-vis the 
government. They never tired of pointing out to the government the obvious irony that West 
European and capitalist Asian countries provided more state support – at least in the view of 
Jadranbrod – to their shipbuilding industries than socialist Yugoslavia. 
So, Uljanik and the other major shipbuilders in Yugoslavia first had to survive late 
socialism before they could even think of how to survive post-socialism. The strategies and 
tactics used by Uljanik to negotiate between demands arising from international competition 
and from the technic peculiarities of shipbuilding on the one hand, from the constraints and 
opportunities of self-managed socialism on the other, were quite illustrative for creative but 
often also futile business practices in Yugoslavia at that time. These involved complex 
interactions between different levels of decision making, coalitions and antagonisms between 
different groups of actors, and deals with questionable legitimacy. The details of securing 
financing for building ships alone opens up a vivid picture of the problems plaguing the wider 
 
5 On the case of labor migration this argument was made by Carl-Ulrik Schierup: Migration, socialism and the 
international division of labour. The Yugoslavian experience. Aldershot: Avebury, 1990. 
6 Hugh Murphy: “Appendix 1: The effects of the oil price shocks on shipbuilding in the 1970s”, in: Raquel Varela, 
Hugh Murphy, Marcel van der Linden (eds.): Shipbuilding and ship repair workers around the world. Case studies 
1950–2010. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017, p. 665–673. 
7 János Kornai: “The Soft Budget Constraint,” Kyklos, 39(1), 1986, 3–30. 
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Yugoslav economy. The case of Uljanik shows that the prevailing conditions nourished tactics 
of muddling through. These muddling-through techniques would proof useful also in the 
1990s and 2000s but the came with a major price: they helped to eternally postpone structural 
reforms – until it was too late. As an appreciative participant in one of the negotiations 
between the Croatian republic and the Yugoslav federal government about state support for 
shipbuilding recognized already in 1979: “We always search ad-hoc-solutions, in constant 
danger of the problem to persist and not to be solved.”8 
  
 
8 “BILJEŠKA o vodjenim razgovorima članova delegacije Sabora SRH”, 25 May 1979, in: HDA (Croatian State 
Archive, Zagreb), f. 280, kut. 174, br. 481. 
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A brief Look back 
The acute liquidity problems plaguing Uljanik since the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s 
were a direct result of the global slump of the demand in ships but also of the firm’s peculiar 
response to it. Yet, this raises the question why this shipyard in a socialist country was so 
exposed to world market developments. The reasons for this were connected with decisions 
taken in the two decades earlier, when Uljanik and the other large Yugoslav shipbuilders 
embarked on an ambitious strategy to become export-oriented while still operating under the 
constraints of a socialist system. To enter the world market seemed a smart move in the mid-
1950s and aligned well with Yugoslavia’s hyperactive foreign policy, which helped to open up 
market opportunities across the globe, especially in the “Third World” but also the West. 
Uljanik started to espouse the world market with optimism: in 1960, when the global postwar 
boom in the demand for new ships came to an end, Uljanik struck a self-confident tone. Its 
company journal “Uljanik”, launched in 1960, informed its readers about the correct way to 
respond to the world market challenge: “We could either prepare for the struggle of competition 
or reduce capacity. Naturally, we took the first way.”9 With huge investments from the state, 
Uljanik indeed managed to become an internationally well-known brand; but it also grew 
dependent on export – a dependency that proved difficult to square with the specific conditions 
of a self-managed country especially when the global market turned sour. 
From 1969 to 1975, Uljanik delivered zero ships to Yugoslav customers, whereas as many 
as 25 went to foreign owners. This was a source of pride for the shipyard, also given the low 
post-war starting point of the company. It seems natural that neither management nor workers 
wanted to question the export-oriented business strategy. Had they not also repaired and 
refurbished Tito’s official yacht, Galeb, another source of pride? In 1947, when Yugoslavia 
gained control over Pula, Uljanik looked like an improbable success story. The shipyard, 
founded by the Austrians in 1856 and flourishing until World War One, had become a shade 
of its former self during the interwar period, when Istria belonged to Italy. Under Italian rule, 
it did not get commissions for any new constructions and was reduced to repair and 
dismantling work. The workforce of Cantiere Navale Scoglio Olivi as the shipyard was 
known during Italian times did not surpass a couple of hundred workers (in Austrian times, 
up to 7,000 people worked on it).10 To make matters worse, the shipyard suffered from heavy 
bombardment by Allied raids on Pula during the Second World War because the Italian and 
 
9 “U borbi za opstanak jači pobjeduju”, Uljanik, no 10, 1960, p. 22. 
10  Tone Peruške: “Historijat “Uljanika” do 1947 godine,” in: Pomorski zbornik, vol. 2. Zadar: Društvo za 
proučavanje i unapredenje pomorstva Jugoslavije u Rijeci, 1964, p. 408. 
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German navies used the port. 70 percent of the shipyard’s buildings and 30 percent of its 
machinery were destroyed.11 The only worthwhile legacy from the Italian period was the 
memory of labor unrest by the workers, which helped to solidify Pula’s antifascist 
credentials.12 
The political situation after the end of the war was not conducive to business either. Istria 
was claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy, and Pula first became an exclave of the Italian 
administered Zone A in the Yugoslav Zone B. Effectively, it was controlled by an Anglo-
American military mission. At the beginning of 1947, before Yugoslavia and Italy agreed on 
the ownership of Pula, the sound of the passing bell to the shipyard could be heard when its 
Italian owners prepared to move the remaining machinery to Italy. This provided the scenery 
for another heroic act of workers defense – so, at least, was the official communist storyline: 
“(…) the workers, although dismissed, organized ‘workers guards’ and watched over the 
machinery.”13 When it became clear that Pula would belong to Yugoslavia, the owners of 
the shipyard, the Trieste based Cosulich family (which owned also the Monfalcone shipyard 
until its nationalization, today’s Fincantieri) agreed to sell the shipyard to the Yugoslav 
government, allegedly for 64 million lire. Here is how the communist-time narrative 
describes what followed next: “On March 10, 1947, the workers choose their management 
who were prominent workers and trade union activists. On the following day the shipyard 
was reopened and 168 new workers were employed.” 14  Cantiere Navale Scoglio Olivi 
became Uljanik – both names derive from the name of the Olive Island in the Bay of Pula, 
which forms the center of the shipyard. September 16, 1947, when the Anglo-American 
forced left the city, became the day of the second liberation of Uljanik and the starting point 
of spectacular post-war growth: 
“(…) that was the final day of its [Pula’s] liberation. As far as the shipyard was concerned it was 
the beginning of a period distinguished by great transformation and progress, during which history 
has become interlaced with the reality we are still living through.”15 
 
11 Hrvoje Markulinčić, Armando Debeljuh (eds.): Uljanik 1856–2006. Pula: Arsenal design, 2006, p. 97. In the 
whole of Pula, only 26% of all buildings remained unscathed (Darko Dukovski: Povijest Pule. Deterministički 
kaos i jahači apokalipse. Pula: Istarski ogranak društva hrvatskih književnika, 2011, p. 201). 
12 The archive of the Italian prefecture of Istria contains interesting information on workers’ protest and 
defiance, see: DAPA (State Archive in Pazin), f. 55: Prefettura dell’Istria di Pola (Prefektura Istre u Puli). For 
a brief summary of the communist official account see Josip Iskra (ed.): Brodograđevna industrija Uljanik. Pula 
1986, p. 17–8. 
13 Iskra, Brodograđevna industrija Uljanik, p. 19. 
14 Ibid., p. 19. 
15 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Indeed, after the takeover by the Yugoslav government, rehabilitation began quickly and 
employment numbers increased, from 436 at the end of 1947 to 2,513 by the end of 1953.16 
However, the trajectory to become an export-oriented enterprise that embraced market 
competition was far from pre-ordained. On the contrary, during the early post-war years Uljanik 
looked destined to become a ‘typical’ socialist factory: large, inefficient, oriented towards the 
domestic market, and dominated by the party-state. Until 1953, Uljanik such as other Yugoslav 
shipyards was controlled by the Central Shipbuilding Administration of the Ministry of 
Defense, which assigned to Uljanik the task to build large ships. 
The party committee in the shipyard showed the usual obsessions like those harbored by 
party committees in factories across the Soviet bloc.17 From the – very long – minutes of 
Uljanik party committee meetings in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it transpires that the 
communists at Uljanik considered their main task to execute orders coming from above. The 
party cells were to act as a transmission belt translating decisions taken by the Central 
Committee into local action. The goal was to achieve rapid, state-led industrialization, which 
was the central economic policy objective at that time.18 The committee minutes speak of 
socialist competition and shock workers, of the brigade organization of labor and of the 
mobilization of workers, of norm overachievement, work discipline and the never-ending 
struggle to “raise productivity”. In a word, the party tried to control the enterprise and its 
workers and promoted ideas typical of Stalinist shopfloor politics. 
The surviving documentation of Uljanik party committee meetings also point to the fact that 
these initiatives suffered a similar fate like those in other socialist countries. Workers found 
ways how to evade mobilization and to subvert party control. Discipline remained slack and 
productivity low.19 One party official concluded in August, 1951, that “discipline is dreadful 
and cannot get worse. The authority of foremen and department heads is at zero.”20 Labor 
fluctuation was high, absenteeism as well because many workers called in sick. The 
organization of production was haphazard. It frequently happened that some workshops stood 
idle whereas others did overwork. All this sounds similar to workers’ tactics of evasion across 
 
16 Ibid., p. 23. 
17 These documents are kept in the regional state archive of Pazin (Istria), DAPA, f. 390/2.3 (Gradski komitet 
Saveza komunista Hrvatske Pula). 
18 More on communist economic policies in Yugoslavia see Susan L. Woodward: Socialist unemployment. The 
political economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995; Vladimir Unkovski-
Korica: The economic struggle for power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. From World War II to non-alignment. London, 
New York: I.B. Tauris., 2016. 
19 “Program rada partijskog komiteta pri poduzeće “Uljanik” za period august-septembar 1951 g.,” in: DAPA 
(State Archive in Pazin), f. 390/2.3, kut. 29. 
20 “Zapisnik sa sastanka Tvorničkog Partijskog Komiteta održanog dana 28.8.1951 god.,” in: DAPA, f. 390/2.3, 
kut. 29. 
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the socialist bloc in the years of Stalinism.21 By the mid-1950s, the local party committee 
apparently lost its hope to effect radical change. A 1954 report stated that the party had not 
succeeded in becoming a political factor in the shipyard.22 
A reason why the party accepted defeat was one of the most important pieces of legislation 
in Yugoslavia’s incremental departure from Soviet orthodoxy: the “Basic Law on the 
Administration of State Enterprises” in June 1950, which introduced workers’ self-
management in state-owned enterprises. Uljanik belonged to the pioneering 215 major 
industrial enterprises, for which the new law stipulated the creation of a workers’ council.23 
This law was one of two important legislative changes that greatly supported the 
transformation of Uljanik into a dynamic, export-oriented enterprise. The second innovation 
was the abolishment of the state monopoly over foreign trade in 1952. While the long-term 
economic effects of the two laws were not immediately obvious and the changes required 
some time to become social reality, they would soon create new opportunity structures but 
also impose new constraints. Eventually, business would be done in a very different way as 
compared to the mixture of government micro-management cum Stalinist mobilization efforts 
characteristic for the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Why did the two laws transform business practices? Self-management – regardless of the 
contested question, how much power blue-collar workers really wielded in enterprises – led to 
the concentration of decision making on the enterprise level. It brought about a strong coalition 
between management and workers, mediated through skilled and white-collar workers who 
dominated the workers councils. Workers councils at least offered an opportunity to put 
pressure on directors. While the party committee in the shipyard had spent much time on 
discussing broader political questions and international relations, the workers’ council focused 
on bread-and-butter issues, such as workplace safety and salaries.24 Previously, such concerns 
had been denounced as “social-democratic attitudes” by party activists.25  Now they were 
considered perfectly legitimate and helped to turn workers into stakeholders in the success of 
their factory. 
 
21 Good starting points for a comparative exploration are two important edited collections: Peter Hübner, Christoph 
Kleßmann, Klaus Tenfelde (eds.), Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit. 
Cologne, Vienna, Weimar: Böhlau, 2005; Marsha Siefert (ed.): Labor in State-Socialist Europe, 1945–1989. 
Contributions to a History of Work. Budapest: CEU Press, 2019. 
22 “Referat sa konferencije Saveza Komunista ‘Uljanik’, 28.4.1954,” in: DAPA, f. 390/2.3, kut. 29. 
23 The first workers’ councils was created in December 1949 in a cement factory in the town of Solin, near Split. 
Igor Stanić: “Što pokazuje praksa? Primjer funkcioniranja samoupravljanja u brodogradilištu Uljani 1961.–1968. 
godine,” Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 46(3), 2014, p. 455. 
24 Stanić, “Što pokazuje praksa?”, p. 461. 
25 “Zapisnik sa sastanka partijske jedinice „Uljanik-a“, 31.1.1949“, in: DAPA, f. 390/2.3, kut. 29; 2.3.2.2. 
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The workers’ council understood well that if it helped the shipyard to earn money, all 
workers would benefit; it awarded, for example, bonuses to workers showing exemplary 
commitment and discipline on the workplace.26 At the same time, the management knew that 
however strong their actual influence in the workers’ council was, they needed the consent of 
workers – especially skilled ones – in order to keep things running. Working in tandem, 
management and workers representatives managed to emancipate the enterprise from the 
party. As Goran Musić has observed in his detailed account of shopfloor relations in two 
factories in Slovenia and Serbia, “the introduction of self-management (…) created distinct 
local identities.”27 
At the same time, workers’ councils helped enterprises entering market-based relations 
with each other because they limited vertical control by political bodies outside of the factory. 
Decision-making on business issues was increasingly concentrated on the enterprise level.28 
Self-management turned enterprises from a department of a state ministry into a company 
that would increasingly – although never exclusively – follow a business rationale. Of course, 
the economy in Yugoslavia was always more than ‘just’ the production of profits and never 
became fully separated from state and government – but where is this really the case? 
Business is embedded in wider social relations, thus its functioning is always also a function 
of the prevailing social fabric.29 Still, market liberalization and the liberalization of foreign 
trade had significant consequences for the shopfloor.30 Efficiency was not only an ideological 
catchphrase any more but a practical necessity for entering the international market. 
Shipbuilding became one of the export industries through which the government hoped to 
earn much needed hard currency. This gave the management of shipyards like Uljanik 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government: on the one hand, the management could reject 
overtly partisan interventions by stressing that party instructions would harm international 
competitiveness. On the other hand, the strong export position was a convenient argument 
whenever the enterprise asked for state support – which, after 1974 would become a state of 
permanence, then showing the downside of the reliance on export. 
  
 
26 Stanić, “Što pokazuje praksa?,” p. 461. 
27 Goran Musić: The self-Managing Factory after Tito. The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism on the Shop Floor. PhD 
dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2016, p. 55. 
28 Vladimir Unkovski-Korica: “Worker’s Councils in the Service of the Market: New Archival Evidence on the 
Origins of Self-Management in Yugoslavia 1948–1950,” Europe-Asia Studies 66(1), 2014, p. 108–34. 
29 See Mark Granovetter: “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness”, The American 
Journal of Sociology 91(3), 1986, p. 481510. DOI: 10.1086/228311. 
30 Musić, The self-Managing Factory after Tito. 
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Uljanik flagship projects of the 1950s indicated the shift away from the domestic to the 
international market. The first success was the finishing of the fundamental repairs of the ship 
Galeb (Seagull), which Tito would frequently use for his journeys abroad. In 1956, the first 
newly built large ship, the cargo ship Uljanik, was delivered to the Yugoslav shipping company 
Jugolinija (seated in Rijeka). Tito was present at the christening of the ship. Yet, the future lay 
somewhere else, as manifest in the next big project: in 1958, the first cargo ship for a foreign 
owner was completed, Al Mokattan for Egypt.31 The new, more conducive conditions for 
foreign business made it easier for Uljanik also to buy and use foreign technology and supplies. 
This was essential for producing ships for international customers. In 1953, for example, 
Uljanik signed a license agreement with the Copenhagen-based diesel engine maker Burmeister 
& Wain, which helped turn Uljanik into a supplier of diesel engines for other Yugoslav and 
even foreign shipyards.32 The number of workers in the shipyard in the meantime reached 4,000 
by 1959.33 A party committee session in February 1957 stroke a completely different tone from 
those in the early 1950s: now, optimism and satisfaction of what has been achieved shined 
through its minutes, which boasted of the enterprise’s “great results.” Thanks to that, Uljanik 
had become an essential part of the social fabric of the municipality of Pula: in 1956, it 
contributed 436 million dinar in contributions to local self-government bodies.34  
Uljanik, such as the other main shipyards in Yugoslavia, benefitted from the unprecedented 
worldwide boom in shipbuilding after the end of the Second World War. It was greatly 
supported by the government, which invested more than 4 billion dinar in the shipyard from 
1948 until the late 1950s.35 This expansion of capacity was much more than the home market 
could absorb, which is why the export orientation came almost naturally.36 In order to meet the 
growing international demand, Uljanik planned to invest further nine billion dinar in the 1960–
65 period in order to build up new capacity.37 Accordingly, output was greatly increased with 
a clear emphasis on export. Out of fifty ships delivered by Uljanik in the 1960s, thirty-six were 
 
31 Iskra, Brodograđevna industrija Uljanik, p. 24. 
32 Željko Šesnić: “Posljednjih 60 godina Brodogradilišta Uljanik”, in: Bruno Dobrić (ed.): Stotinu i pedeset 
godina brodogradnje u Puli. Zbornik radova s međunarodnog skupa prigodom 150. obljetnice osnutka C.kr. 
pomorskog arsenala (Pula, 8. prosinca 2006.) Pula: Društvo za proučavanje prošlosti C. i. kr. Mornarice "Viribus 
unitis, 2010, p. 244. 
33 Markulinčić, Debeljuh, Uljanik 1856–2006, p. 107; “Razvoj brodogradilišta,” Uljanik 1(4–5), 1960, p. 12. 
34 “Zapisnik održane konferencije organizacije SK ‘Uljanik’ , 10.2.1957,” in: DAPA, f. 390/2.3, kut. 29; 2.3.2.2. 
(2.3.2.2.1. Zapisnici sastanaka, izvještaji TK SKH brodogradilišta “Uljanik”).  
35 “Deset godina uspjeha,” Uljanik 1(7), 1960, p. 3. 
36 Michael Palairet: “Croatian shipbuilding in crisis, 1979–1995”, in: Srećko Goić (ed.): Enterprise in Transition. 
Proceedings. Fourth International Conference on Enterprise in Transition, Split-Hvar, May 24–26, 2001. Split: 
Faculty of Economics, 2001, p. 759 [CD Rom]. 
37 “Preko devet milijardi dinara za proširenje i modernizaciju pogona,” Uljanik 1(9), 1960, p. 2. 
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for foreign owners.38 The government supported such exports, when they went to hard currency 
countries or to developing countries; such export subsidies covered between 20 and 33 percent 
of the call price, depending on country of delivery. In case of clearing and barter, though, no 
export support was provided by the state.39 Yugoslav shipbuilding became heavily geared 
towards export markets: almost 90 percent of built tonnage between 1964 and 1975 was for 
foreign purchasers.40 Shipbuilding became the most export-oriented sector of Yugoslavia’s 
industry. No other shipbuilding nation had such a high export percentage like the Yugoslav one 
(from 1969 to 1978, 93 to 100 percent of the annual deliveries went abroad). 
The list of Uljanik’s customers reflected Yugoslavia’s foreign policies: they included 
friendly ‘Third World’ countries, especially non-aligned ones, such as Egypt, Sudan, and India, 
but alo Western countries (Norway, Sweden), and countries of the Soviet Bloc after relations 
with them had been normalized. The single most prolific purchaser was the Soviet Union 
through its import organization Sudoimport. Western costumers, such as Greek ship-owners, 
were ‘hidden’ behind flags of convenience (Liberia, Panama). The largest ship Uljanik anytime 
built – the tanker Berge Istra with almost 230,000 dwt – went to Norway. In the 1970s, Uljanik 
became practically exclusively focused on exports: only two out of forty-two newly built ships 
in the 1970s were delivered to domestic customers.41  
 
 
  
 
38 “ULJANIK Group reference list”, https://uljanik.hr/images/reference/ULJANIK_Group_reference_list.pdf (last 
accessed 8 October 2019). 
39 Jadranbrod: “Sadašnje stanje, eknomski položaj i problemi razvoja brodogradnje” (Zagreb, 1980), in: HDA, 
f. 1398, kn. 6. 
40 Ante Bulić: “Razvojni tok jugoslavenske brodogradnje od početka do danas”, Brodogradnje 36(1–2), 1988, p. 63. 
41 “Preko devet milijardi dinara za proširenje i modernizaciju pogona,” Uljanik, 1(9), 1960, p. 2. 
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Global Business Cycles and the Ensuing Yugoslav Economic Malaise 
“Seaborne trade is the backbone of the world economy. About 90 per cent of world trade is 
transported by ships,” stresses the introduction of a pioneering volume on shipyard labor.42 Yet, 
the inverse relationship is also true: as an internationally competitive industry, the cycles of 
shipbuilding closely follow those of international trade, usually with a time lag of few years. 
Yugoslav shipbuilding was not spared this lesson either: it was hugely affected by the slump in 
the demand for new ships after the 1973 oil price shock. However, in contrast to capitalist 
countries, Yugoslavia did not restructure its shipbuilding during the long stagnation of demand, 
nor was employment cut. Uljanik is a case in point: it reached peak employment in the late 
1980s, with more than 8,000 workers, at a time when the company constantly struggled with 
illiquidity, and when its international competitors cut costs.  
The global economic crisis after the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1974 ended the long-lasting 
expansion of international shipbuilding in the 1950s and 1960s, which had been driven by 
booming demand for oil tankers. In the early 1970s, more than 80 percent of the vessels in the 
world’s order books were tankers.43 The average size of vessels had increased greatly, also as 
result of the blockade of the Suez Canal after 1956. Ship-owners sought to compensate the 
longer journey around Cape Horn by increasing tonnage. After 1974, the demand for new ships 
collapsed as less oil was traded and international trade in general collapsed: in 1976, the 
worldwide annual volume of new orders for ships was 46 percent of the 1974 level.44 The price 
for newly built ships declined by 40 percent in 1975.45 Many customers cancelled orders, even 
though they had to pay high penalties, or renegotiated the term of their contracts or flatly refused 
to accept deliveries. The second oil price shock of 1979–80 again reduced demand for new 
ships. It took twenty-seven years to reach again the 1974 peak of new launches in terms of 
tonnage, which was 36.4 mgt. Between 1978 and 1991, world output was less than half of the 
1974 level and did not start to grow consistently again until 1989–90.46 
Governments all around the world came to help and supported their struggling shipbuilders 
with subsidies and import restrictions. According to information provided to the Croatian 
government, Western countries covered 20 to 30 percent, in Great Britain allegedly even up to 
50 percent of the prices of ships, allowing shipyards to survive by selling ships for deflated 
 
42 Marcel van der Linden, Hugh Murphy, Raquel Varela: “Introduction”, in: ibid. (eds.): Shipbuilding and ship repair 
workers around the world. Case studies 1950–2010. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017, p. 15. 
43 Murphy, “Appendix 1”, p. 667. 
44 Ibid., p. 667. 
45  “Zapisnik od proširene sjednice Republičkog odbora sindikata radnika proizvodnje i prerade metala SR 
Hrvatske”, Rijeka, 14.11.1975, in: HDA, f. 1398, kn. 1, p. 8. 
46 Anthony Slaven: British Shipbuilding 1500–2010. A history. Lancaster: Crucible, 2013, p. 212. 
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prices on the world market. 47  In Sweden and Great Britain, governments nationalized 
shipbuilding in the late 1970s (in bother countries, this would not prevent the fatal decline of 
the industry). Western shipbuilders also delivered the majority of launches to domestic 
customers, benefitting from protection of the domestic market and government support for ship-
owners to renew their fleets. Yugoslavia, in contrast, had no functioning system of supporting 
a specific industry hit by external shocks – a fact, which even the federal ministry of finance 
had to admit.48 
At the same time, Western shipbuilders greatly reduced capacity, by restructuring, closing 
wharfs, and downsizing their workforce. West Germany’s shipbuilding industry, for example, 
retained in 1990 only 32 percent of its 1975 employment level. 49  At the same time, it 
increasingly moved towards the construction of cruise ships, where profit rates were higher. 
The leading producer worldwide, Japan, reduced capacity by more than a third and cut the 
shipbuilding workforce even by two thirds until the late 1980s.50 One notable exception to 
capacity reduction was South Korea, where massive state aid stimulated the emergence of new, 
large-scale shipbuilding companies. Hyundai, which built its first large tanker in 1973, became 
the world’s largest shipbuilder by the early 1980s.51 South Korea climbed to second place in 
the world’s ranking of shipbuilding nations behind only Japan by the mid-1980s. It would 
become number one in the 2000s, before being overtaken by the PR of China. In the meantime, 
European shipbuilding was marginalized, its global market share falling into the low single 
digits. 52  European shipyards increasingly concentrated on special fabrications while 
conventional large ships, such as tankers and bulk carriers, were built by the Asian producers.53 
However, South Korea was not the only producer not reducing capacity: Yugoslavia also 
refrained from it in the 1970s and 1980s – but with much less success than South Korea. 
The shift of production towards East Asia was the major trend in global shipbuilding after 
World War Two, and it was greatly accelerated by the 1970s crisis. Great Britain, which for 
decades had dominated shipbuilding, experienced an unstoppable decline. In 1930 it had 
launched half of the total tonnage in the world, in 1964 ten percent, three percent in 1980, and 
 
47 Jadranbrod: “Stanje, ekonomski položaj i problemi nezaposlenosti kapaciteta brodogradilišta” (Zagreb, June 
1980), in: HDA, f. 1398, p. 19; SRH, IVS: “Platforma za rješenje problema brodogradnje i brodarstva”, 14.7.1977, 
in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 108, br. 979, 
48 “BILJEŠKA o vodjenim razgovorima članova delegacije Sabora SRH”, Zagreb, 25.5.1979, in: HDA, f. 280, 
kut. 174, br. 481. 
49 Murphy, “Appendix 1”, p. 672. 
50 Ibid.; Slaven, British Shipbuilding, p. 214. 
51 van der Linden, Murphy, Varela, Introduction, p. 20. 
52 Slaven, British Shipbuilding, p. 214. 
53 “Jučer, danas, sutra – naše brodogradnje”, Brodogradnje, 34(1), 1986, p. 6. 
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less than one percent in 1990.54 At the same time, Japan rose to global predominance: its share 
of the world market of constructed volume grew from less than five percent in the mid-1950s 
to more than fifty percent in the 1970s.55 Many European shipyards did not survive Asian 
competition and closed, while others shifted to more profitable, specialized segments of the 
market. 
For Uljanik and the other large Yugoslav shipbuilders, 1974 was a turning point not only 
because of the start of the long global recession, but also because of domestic developments: 
the new constitution of that year greatly transformed the conditions for business. One major 
change concerned the further decentralization of economic policies, as the powers of the 
republics were strengthened and the federal government weakened. This included 
decentralization of banking. In the end, the 1974 constitution and subsequent legislation 
increased antagonisms between the territorial units of Yugoslavia, because the republics and 
autonomous provinces ended up with widely diverging economic interests. The veto power of 
republic leaderships also hamstrung the federal government, especially when it tried to 
implement economic reforms in the 1980s. 
Another major development was the expansion of self-management culminating in the 1976 
Act of Associated Labor, which run to 671 articles.56 Officially, enterprises did not exist 
anymore. The 1974 constitution and the 1976 law did not speak of “firm” (poduzeće). The 1976 
law split enterprises in smaller units, so called Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (in 
Serbo-Croatian abbreviation OOUR). These were organized around certain production tasks 
and were supposed to be the fundamental economic organizations; several OOURs formed an 
Organization of Associated Labor (Serbo-Croatian OUR) or a Work Organization (radna 
organizacija, RO), which in turn could form a so-called Complex Organization of Associated 
Labor (SOUR) and a Business Community (poslovna zajednica). These overarching 
organizations were legally thought as purely coordinating bodies, while decisions should be 
taken on the basis. By 1978, 19,000 OOUR’s existed throughout Yugoslavia. Uljanik was split 
into five work organizations with a total of 12 OOUR’s. 
Obviously, these reforms increased complexity, made decision-making even more difficult, 
and impeded efficiency. The flourishing of self-management bodies led to higher transaction 
costs, manifest in the rise of the share of administrative employees and the inflation of directors. 
 
54 Hugh Murphy: “Labour in the British shipbuilding and ship repair industries in the twentieth century”, in: Raquel 
Varela, Hugh Murphy, Marcel van der Linden (eds.): Shipbuilding and ship repair workers around the world. 
Case studies 1950–2010. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017, p. 61, 78, 103. 
55 van der Linden, Murphy, Varela, “Introduction”, p. 20 (table 1.1). 
56 John R. Lampe: Yugoslavia as history. Twice there was a country. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996, 
p. 310. 
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n Uljanik, for example, the share of blue collar workers allegedly declined from more than 50 percent 
to some 30 percent in the second half of the 1970s.57 OOURs often charged each other higher prices 
than external suppliers. Instead of market relations, so called “social compacts” and “self-
management agreements” should direct allocation of capital, production and distribution.58 For 
Uljanik – and the other shipbuilders – such a fundamental reorganization could not come at a 
worse time. It compounded their problems from the outfall of the decline in global demand for 
new ships. Uljanik – it appears from company documents and newspaper reporting – struggled 
for years to adapt the new organizational principles. In 1978, for example, the enterprise 
magazine deplored that “the constitutional transformation is still under progress” and not all 
self-management stipulations have been implemented.59 These organizational complications 
increased the time it took to build a ship up to almost twice as long as for comparable vessels 
in Western shipyards. 
Uljanik’s struggle to survive the ensuing global shipbuilding crisis illustrates the effects of 
these constitutional changes on business, and the strategies developed by an enterprise – which 
formally was not anymore an enterprise – to “muddle through”. One of the major problems was 
the volatile nature of regulations which often changed. Aside from that, the overall economic 
outlook continued to darken in Yugoslavia. Economic actors, therefore, lacked security and 
predictability which greatly impeded long-term, strategic planning. Yugoslav shipbuilders did 
not struggle only with a hostile international market but also with opaque domestic conditions. 
Such a situation made short-termism and ad-hoc-solutions the strategy of choice, as Uljanik’s 
struggle to stay afloat shows. Yugoslavia’s shipbuilding industry fell into crisis earlier than 
other branches of the economy – overall, annual GDP growth rates still averaged more than 
five percent in the 1970s.  
Shipbuilding is closely tied to many other industries: it has linkages to heavy industry, from 
which it gets its steel and machinery, and with a myriad of suppliers. It is also directly affected 
by changes in the exchange rate of the domestic currency to the US-dollar, the currency of the 
international ship market.60 In a way, shipbuilding thus acted like a seismograph for general 
economic developments, and its crisis fed back to domestic suppliers of equipment and services. 
Hence, Uljanik and the other Yugoslav shipyards were neither isolated from global nor from 
domestic economic trends. This meant a double punch because by the mid-1970s, the structural 
shortcomings of the Yugoslav economy became ever more evident, even before the economy 
 
57 I “Pucaju zidovi koji su zaklanjali vidike”, Novi list, 18–19.10.1980, p. 5. 
58 For a concise treatment of these reforms and their impact, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as history, p. 309–312. 
59 “U »Uljaniku« je tek oko svaki drugi radnik nagrađen prema stvarno izvršenom radu”, Uljanik, no 24, May 
1978, p. 5. 
60 van der Linden, Murphy, Varela, “Introduction”, p. 15. 
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began to contract in the 1980s. Marie-Janine Calic called the 1970s the “beginning of the end”, 
when the post-war boom fizzled out but the government did not manage to transform the 
economy towards a new, intensive growth pattern.61 The crisis in shipbuilding, therefore, 
anticipated the forthcoming general economic malaise. It also connects the 1970s and 1980s 
with the time after 1991, when Croatia became independent. 
Facing growing economic difficulties the government did not embark on structural reforms 
but tried to borrow its way out in order to maintain investment into industry and consumption 
and to finance the country’s current account deficit. Foreign liabilities of the state increased 
from 4.6 billion to 21 billion US-$ between 1973 and 1981.62 At that point, Yugoslavia could 
not service its debt anymore and reached a stand-by-agreement with the IWF. As usual, aid 
from the IWF was conditional on austerity programs, which intensified economic contraction 
in Yugoslavia and made access to credit more difficult.63 While living standards had been 
growing for many years, citizens now started to feel the economic squeeze in their own pockets. 
Real wages declined by 34 percent between 1980 and 1984.64 Inflation grew incessantly: the 
annual price increase of industrial goods reached 57 percent in 1984 and 82 percent in 1985, 
with further increases in the coming years.65 Interest rates as well reached three-digit figures by 
the late 1980s imposing severe difficulties on business to finance its operations. All this heavily 
affected shipbuilding as an industry in which the production of its output, i.e. ships, was mainly 
financed by credits, due to long production cycles with high material costs and substantial fixed 
expenses; the costs of materials made up a large part of the production costs. Domestic inflation 
and the dinar’s devaluation against West European currencies increased the real costs of 
supplies from abroad. 
  
 
61 Calic, “The Beginning of the End”. 
62 Ibid., p. 73. 
63 Milica Uvalić: The rise and fall of market socialism in Yugoslavia (DOC Research Institute, 2018). Online: 
https://doc-research.org/2018/03/rise-fall-market-socialism-yugoslavia/, last accessed 27 August 2018, p. 10. 
64 Ibid., p. 21. 
65 Mladen Kmetić: “Zaostajanje američkog dolara u odnosu na valute zemalja Zapadne Evrope i inflaciju u zemlji 
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Muddling Through and Building Ships 
Thus, both international and domestic economic conditions were not exactly fortunate for 
Yugoslav shipbuilders since the mid-1970s. The crisis would prove to be persistent and 
actually go on – it seems forever (at least judging from the standpoint of today). The breakup 
of Yugoslavia in 1991, the ensuing war and general economic decline certainly aggravated 
these problems but they did not cause them. They rather crystallized them and made evident 
that despite near-constant debates on the republican and federal level, no structural solution 
to the problems of Yugoslav shipbuilding had been found in the 1970s and 1980s. What we 
see are stopgap measures, ad-hoc-solutions and desperate efforts to find money in order to 
fill liquidity holes. Decision makers embraced a strategy of muddling-through – a strategic 
non-strategy, actually, or in de Certeau’s words a tactic, not a strategy. This was mainly 
caused by the unwillingness of the ruling communists to question the basic pillars of Yugoslav 
socialism, such as social ownership – which implied opaque ownership terms –, self-
management, state interventionism, and their monopoly of power. Actually, some of their 
economic reforms even restricted the functioning of the market, when the opposite was 
warranted. Milica Uvelić wrote about the economic reforms in response to the demands by 
the IMF in the early 1980s: 
“The resulting economic reforms were slow, inefficient, and did not bring any effective changes 
in the functioning of the Yugoslav economic system. As those in the past, they did not touch upon 
the most fundamental features of the Yugoslav economic system (…).”66 
The problems of shipbuilding highlighted several structural shortcomings of the Yugoslav 
economy and its political framework: first, shipbuilding faced peculiarly pressing financing 
issues because of the nature of its business – but illiquidity would become a perennial problem 
of the whole economy; this was directly related to the inefficient banking system. The archive 
of the Executive Council of the Sabor (parliament) of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (the 
government of the republic) registers repeated debates about “financial difficulties” and the 
“problem of financing” of shipbuilding.67 It contains frequent requests from the shipbuilders 
for financial support – any extraordinary event, such as a fire destroying the equipment of a 
newly built ship, could jeopardize their fragile liquidity. 
The shipbuilding industry’s fate manifests the Yugoslav economy’s systematic 
preference for imports, while exporters were disadvantaged – in contrast to official rhetoric 
that encouraged producers to export. An joint open letter by the League of Communists’ 
 
66 Uvalić, The rise and fall of market socialism, p. 10. 
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and the Trade Unions’ Economic Committees in Rijeka in 1975 drily made this point: it 
demanded to “stop treating domestic shipbuilders like foreigners in their own country and 
to give them the same rights such as foreign shipbuilders.”68 Yugoslav economists at that 
time asserted that it was more profitable to sell at home than to export; Robinson and 
Tyson’s CGE based analysis of Yugoslavia’s trade and the effects of export incentives 
corroborated this finding. 69  Uljanik’s long term director, Karlo Radolović, constantly 
complained that the government did not value the specific needs of this emblematic export 
industry. As the mentioned research shows, this was not only a self-interested lament but 
grounded in ‘hard’ facts of economic policy. The government wanted industries like 
shipbuilding to earn hard currencies, which it needed to balance its account, but this did not 
translate into a preferential treatment. 
Consequently, three issues dominated the frequent debates at all government levels in 
regard of the crisis of shipbuilding: first, how to design export incentives in a way that they 
made Yugoslav shipbuilders competitive abroad? Second, how to enable domestic shipping 
lines to buy ships from domestic producers, instead of importing them? Third, how to 
guarantee sufficient funds for the long production cycles of shipbuilding, where customers 
paid most of the price only upon delivery, while production costs had to be financed by the 
shipyard from its cash flow? To spoil suspense: policymakers failed to solve any of these 
problems, despite the sense of urgency nourished also by frequent press reports about the 
crisis of shipbuilding. Pula’s local newspaper Glas Istre, for example, ran articles in 1976 on 
“Shipbuilding in deep water” or “Idle shipbuilding”, highlighting the lack of money and the 
dearth of new orders.70 
Apart from eminent political impediments to structural reform, problem solving was also 
thwarted by entrenched competition between different industries and administrative units. 
Shipbuilding is another example showing the many unintended side effects of de-centralization 
on the ability of strategic policy-making. To put it bluntly: Istria and Dalmatia, where the large 
shipbuilders were located, did obviously not wield the same sort of leverage in industrial policy 
like other regions of Yugoslavia. 
When all these crises culminated in the second half of the 1970s, the promising beginning 
of the decade turned into distant memory for the shipbuilders in Uljanik. It had been in the late 
1960s, when Uljanik finally entered the then booming market for large oil tankers. This lifted 
 
68 Glas Istre, no. 12, 17 January 1975, p. 3. 
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Uljanik from its crisis of the late 1960s, when it hardly earned money and even had experienced 
a strike (in 1967).71 At the beginning of 1970, the company feared to end the year with a loss, 
after it had completed only 50 percent of its 1969 plans and had to pay substantial penalties on 
late deliveries. Glas Istre called it a “wounded lion”.72 Orders for large tankers and freight 
carriers, therefore, seemed to come as a rescue just at the right time. On February 14, 1970, in 
Stockholm, the director of Uljanik, Alfred Foskio, signed a contract with the Swedish shipping 
company Grengsberg for the delivery of two ships with 265,000 dwt and more than 330 meters 
long – by far the largest ships Uljanik had ever built. At that time, newspapers called these 
orders the biggest successes of Yugoslav shipbuilding.73 In 1973, the new general director of 
Uljanik, Karlo Bilić, called the “Mammoths” the future of Uljanik, not only because of the 
global demand for such ships but also because these ships were paid in cash: “With these ships, 
we actually finance ourselves.”74 The shipyard invested around 300 billion dinar in extending 
its capacities to be able to build even 400,000 dwt carriers.75 
Only two years later, though, Glas Istre reported about the “End of the Era of ‘Mammoths’”. 
It turned out that this had not been a particularly successful era: instead of “wealth”, the large 
ships brought “large losses”. The newspaper concluded that the fickle world market, 
“apparently showed its teeth”.76 A last, ninth, mamut, was delivered in July 1976, for a Liberian 
customer. At that time, global demand for large tankers had totally collapsed. 
The construction of these large ships also showed the technical limits of Uljanik. The hull 
had to be built in two separate halves before these were united.77 The vessels required more 
steel than Yugoslav steelmakers would provide, so Uljanik had to purchase steel abroad which 
amounted to delays and payments in direly needed hard currency. Large ships generally meant 
more supplies from abroad and, therefore, more tariff payments. The mamuti were an over-
sized micro-cosmos of Uljanik’s and the other large Yugoslav shipbuilders’ structural 
difficulty: to operate as export-oriented enterprises in an economic system geared towards 
import substitution and towards producing social welfare. Uljanik, for example, for years 
continued to struggle with high debts because of the loan requirements to finance the building 
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74 “‘Mamuti’ budućnost ‘Uljanika’” [interview with Karlo Bilić], Glas Istre, no. 162, 14–15 July 1973, p. 3. 
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of ships for foreign customers, and these large ships posed particular risks if a client would 
fail to heed its commitments.78 In the crisis of the 1970s, this problem became even worse as 
customers cancelled orders or asked for discounts. 
Therefore, no solution to the problems of Yugoslav shipbuilding seemed more obvious than 
re-orienting it towards domestic customers. International demand from purchasers who would 
pay in real, that is, convertible money had anyway all but evaporated. Secondly, the Yugoslav 
government wanted to expand its merchant shipping fleet so that a higher share of Yugoslav 
exports would be transported by domestic firms, rather than by foreign ship owners. The 
Yugoslav merchant fleet was also in the urgent need of replacing outdated vessels with new ones. 
Could not an international crisis be used as a chance to give the domestic market a boost? As the 
following section will show this apparently so self-evident solution, though, would never work, 
despite frequent high-level policy debates and constant lobbying by the Yugoslav shipbuilders. 
An event in another of the major shipbuilders, “3rd of May” in Rijeka, from 1975 can 
illustrate the underlying tensions. In mid-January 1975, extraordinary sessions of the League of 
Communists’ committee and the trade-union in this shipyard passed a protest note to the 
Jugolinija shipping company (seated a couple of hundred meters to the east of the shipyard on 
the Rijeka shoreline), and also made this letter known to the republic and federal governments. 
The shipyard representatives fiercely denounced the recent signing by Jugolinija of a contract 
with the East German shipyard Warnowerft in Rostock for the purchase of four container 
vessels priced 52 million US-$.79 Jugolinija had not even waited until the expiration of the 
deadline of the announced tender, so that Jadranbrod even could not file an offer. The protest 
letter drily stressed that all this was especially unacceptably because for years, there had been 
talks about the purchasing of ships by domestic shipping lines from domestic suppliers. The 
director of the shipyard in Rijeka, Aldo Žefran, demanded that “We need to end, once and for 
all, the situation unique in the global economy that we [the shipbuilders] are strangers in our 
own house.”80 What was the problem? For domestic shipping companies, it was cheaper to buy 
from abroad. Could that not be changed? As the next section will show, the answer was no; in 
1986, ten years after its conclusion, the program for building ships for Yugoslav ship-owners 
still waited for solid financial foundations.81 
 
78 “‘Uljanik’ – teškoće zbog duga”, Vjesnik, 2.7.1972; “‘Mamut’ pokrio mamustki gubitak”, Novi list, 4 September 1974. 
79 “Protest riječkih brodograditelja. Protiv još jednog ugovora o gradnji domaćih brodova u inozemstvu”, Glas 
Istre, no. 12, 17 January 1975 p. 3. See also the protest letter by the shipyard’s management, 16 January 1975, to 
the republic and federal governments, in: HDA, f. 280, Kut. 30; br. 1010 (“Izgradnja brodova za domaće brodare 
u našim brodogradilištima. Prigovor na rješenje Saveznog deviznog inspektorata”). 
80 “Izgradnja brodova za domaće brodare u našim brodogradilištima. Prigovor na rješenje Saveznog deviznog 
inspektorata”, in: HDA, f. 280, Kut. 30. br. 1010. 
81 “Jučer, danas, sutra – naše brodogradnje”, Brodogradnje 34(1), 1986, p. 9. 
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Ultimately, Yugoslav shipyards would construct ships for Yugoslav shipping companies 
though not exactly in the way one would have expected from a socialist country. On April 11, 
1987, high officials from Belgrade and Zagreb came down to Pula attending the launching 
(porinuće) of the new 177 meters long container ship “Koper ekspres”. The president of the 
Yugoslav parliament (skupština) was here, Ivo Vrandečić, who previously had been head of 
Jadranbrod, the main industry body; he was joined by the head of the Federal Executive 
Council, Branko Mikulić, and the head of the Executive Council of the Croatian Sabor, Anton 
Milović. On the surface, it seemed that, finally, a Yugoslav shipyard had built a large ship for 
a Yugoslav costumer, as the ship was to enter into service of Rijeka based Jugolinija. This was 
probably the reason why high officials attended the launching of an otherwise ordinary ship. 
However, Jugolinija was neither costumer nor owner: the ship was delivered to an owner in 
Panama, from whom Jugolinija would lease it.82 Such arrangements – delivery to a foreign 
owner, lease by a Yugoslav shipping line – were apparently common at that time. In 1987 alone, 
Uljanik delivered at least three more ships to foreign owners (one each in Lebanon, Panama 
and Liberia) – all notorious flags of convenience), that then went into the service of Yugoslav 
shipping lines (Splošna plovba, Jugolinija, Jugotanker). 
From the existing documentation, not the full business logic can be reconstructed. There 
were rumors about strawmen, shell forms and kickbacks for the participants, which naturally 
left no trace in the business documentation. What is sure is that Uljanik enjoyed export subsidies 
and tariff exemptions for exporting to a “developing country” such as Liberia.83 Yugoslav 
shipping lines apparently at that time had already switched to the wide-spread practice to lease 
rather than purchase ships in order to keep fixed capital ratios low. There were also tax breaks 
for the import of ships. These practices not only point to the business acumen of Yugoslav 
managers but also to the fact that the government, by promoting the reorientation of Yugoslav 
shipbuilders towards domestic customers, had initiated new unintended practices. These helped 
shipbuilding to survive the 1980s without restructuring. This was another example for the 
political economy setting incentives that favored a strategy of muddling through. 
  
 
82 “Vjesti i zanimljivosti iz brodogradnje”, Brodogradnje, no. 2–3, 1987, p. 135. 
83 See Palairet, “Croatian shipbuilding in crisis”. 
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Export vs. Domestic Orientations 
The necessity to do something for shipbuilding became obvious to the government soon after 
the beginning of the global crisis of shipbuilding after the 1973 oil price shock. Jadranbrod, 
as the main lobbying organization of Yugoslavia’s shipbuilders did not fail to hammer down 
this message to various government bodies. Beginning in 1975, there were frequent debates 
on the republic level, and sometimes also on the federal one, about the “Construction of ships 
for domestic shipping companies in our shipyards.”84 This program built on earlier, though 
fruitless efforts starting in 1969 to stimulate production of ships for domestic costumers. 
Despite many high-level meetings, no solution had been found so far. The problem was – and 
continued to be – that domestic production was simply more expensive than imported ships, 
and neither the government nor the banks had been ready to pay up for the price difference. 
Yugoslav shipping lines were also not keen to purchase ships more expensively than 
necessary.85 Now, with global demand rapidly collapsing, the idea of domestic ships for 
domestic ship-owners gained new urgency. The involved stakeholders now undertook more 
systematic efforts to realize it, although ultimately in vain. 
The effort to support shipbuilding be reorienting it towards domestic demand was based on 
sanguine analyses of its current problems. In early 1975, the Ministries (sekretarijat) for Energy, 
Industry and Crafts, and for Shipping, Transport and Communication of the Socialist Republic 
of Croatia produced a joint, detailed report on the “Problems of Shipbuilding and Shipping” 
together with recommendations for their solution.86 The report noted that recently, “there were 
a lot of discussions about the situation of shipbuilding and shipping”, such as in the federal 
government and the Croatian government. Shipbuilding deserved special attention because, 
first, it was a major industrial employer with 24,000 employees and at least 20,000 sub-
contractors (kooperanti). Second, it was Yugoslavia’s industry with the “most beneficial 
currency effect”: during the last four years, shipbuilding had earned 16 billion Dinar in currency 
income, while its outflow – mainly for materials from abroad – was only 7.6 billion.87 In an 
economy that was constantly short of hard currency, this was a major reason why this industry 
enjoyed sympathy by the government. 
 
84 For a first such discussion see “Izgradnja brodova za domaće brodare u našim brodogradilištima”, in: HDA, 
f. 280, kut. 30, br. 1010. 
85  See the report “Kronologija akcija oko gradnje brodova za domaću trgovačku mornaricu u domaćim 
brodogradilištima, 25.4.1977”, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 93, br. 569. 
86 Republički sekretarijat za energetiku, industriju i zanatstvo/Republički sekretarijat za pomorstvo, saobraćaj i 
veze: “Informacija o prolematici brodogradnje i brodarstva s prijedlogom mjera”, Zagreb, January 1975, in: HDA, 
f. 280, kut. 33, br. 1140. 
87 Ibid., p. 2–3. 
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Yet, as the report made clear, shipbuilding was in a major crisis. As the main reasons the 
ministries identified the slump in demand on the world market, just after Yugoslav shipbuilders – 
like their peers in other countries – had increased capacity. Yugoslav shipbuilders were especially 
undercut by Japanese competitors, who offered ships for dumping prices; aside from that, the 
report noted that Western governments began to heavily subsidizing their shipbuilding industries 
or supported it through military contracts. Subsequent documents deplored that subsidies in 
Western countries such as France, the FR Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK, amounted to 
25–35 percent of the ship’s price, allegedly much higher than in Yugoslavia.88 As a result, there 
were hardly any new orders from Western consumers for Yugoslav ships. The situation was a bit 
better in the developing countries, especially the oil producing ones, but there Yugoslav 
shipbuilders faced competition by the heavily subsidized, and more efficient West European and 
Japanese shipyards. The only bright spot was the Soviet Union, which was sparred the recession 
of the 1970s and expanded its oil industry. However, pricing modalities with the Soviets, who did 
not pay in hard currency, were a cause of concern (see below). 
As result of adverse market conditions, the report projected substantial idle capacity for the 
forthcoming years.89 The solution of shifting production to domestic customers had so far not 
been taken because of the specific Yugoslav system of export subsidies. Exporters got support 
in cash and tax deductions, while domestic shipping lines would have to pay high prices for 
ships from domestic shipyards and faced high interests on loans taken for that purpose.90 The 
report concluded: 
“It thus follows that shipbuilding and shipping, both of which work exclusively for the world 
market should not be subjected to the ruling regulations valid for the domestic market, if certain 
negative consequences for the whole system are to be avoided.”91 
Not all difficulties were foreign made, though: the 1975 report also highlighted the 
decreasing competitiveness of Yugoslav shipbuilders, which suffered from outdated 
technology and a lack of capital. Low efficiency translated into high prices: data from the late 
1970s indicate that Yugoslav ships were on average between 31 and 38 percent more 
expensive than world market prices for the same kind of vessels.92 The price difference was 
 
88 IVS, Juni 1979: “Stanje, ekonomski položaj i problemi nezaposlenosti kapaciteta brodogradilišta”, in: HDA, 
f. 280, kut. 174, br. 481, p. 2. 
89 “Informacija o prolematici brodogradnje i brodarstva s prijedlogom mjera”, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 33, br. 1140, 
p. 4–5. 
90 Ibid., p. 6–7. 
91 Ibid., p. 12. 
92 Jadranbrod: “Sadašnje stanje, ekonomski položaj i problemi razvoja brodogradnje”, Zagreb, June 1980, in: 
HDA, f. 1398, kn. 6, p. 9. 
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even higher if price subsidies by Western governments were accounted for. The high prices 
of Yugoslav ships, which impeded their international competitiveness, were also caused by 
the fact that primary products of Yugoslav origin were 50 percent more costly than 
comparable materials supplied from the world market.93 Material inputs amounted to almost 
two thirds of the costs of a vessel – and domestic supplies alone around 45 percent –, thus 
this difference in the price of supplies was hugely consequential. 
Here, one of the structural problems of Yugoslav economic policy became evident: 
exporters were politically forced or at least pressured to procure as much as possible from 
domestic suppliers, even if these asked higher prices than international ones and often 
provided only inferior quality. The government considered the export sectors, such as 
shipbuilding, to be responsible for helping other, non-competitive industries to become 
indirectly integrated in the world market.94 Shipyards were, for example, compelled by the 
government to use steel from a steel mill in Skopje, although it was of low quality and often 
delivered with delays – if at all –, and more expensive than foreign steel (for a Suez-max ship, 
18,000 tons of steel were needed).95 Minutes from a meeting between delegates from the 
Croatian Sabor and the federal government on shipbuilding in May 1979 show that the 
participants were well aware of these problems but never followed through with respective 
measures. Producers in shipbuilding, it was said, 
“can exert minimal influence on the price of their product because into its production go materials, 
whose price is mainly determined by state organs, and which embody low productivity, weak 
organization and aged technology, which then are built into the ship.”96 
As government experts put it: shipbuilding was the “finalizer (finalizator)” of a chain of 
industrial supplies by the domestic industry. This also meant that “in shipbuilding, 
contradictory interests of many domestic producers and domestic customers of these products 
collide”, as one participant in these debates asserted.97 Hence, it became evident that a shipyard 
could hardly maintain international competitiveness, if it sits on top of a chain of inefficient 
suppliers. Shipbuilders, by the way, although unhappy with this arrangement, often used their 
role as a “climactic” producer to justify their demands for money from the state. 
 
93 Ibid., p. 6; “Materijalni položaj jugoslavenske brodogradnje: Društvenom podrškom premostiti teškoće,” 
Brodogradnje 28(1), 1980, p. 12. 
94 Palairet, “Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis”, p. 762. 
95 Ibid., p. 772–3. 
96 “BILJEŠKA o vodjenim razgovorima članova delegacije Sabora SRH”, 25.5.1979, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 174, 
br. 481. 
97 IVS, Juni 1979: “Stanje, ekonomski položaj i problemi nezaposlenosti kapaciteta brodogradilišta”, p. 1, in: 
HDA, f. 280, kut. 174, br. 481, p. 1. 
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Yet, to change such arrangements was politically too sensitive that it was almost out of 
question. The government favored supply chains across republics for reasons of regional policy, 
even if their economic rationale was questionable. Neither did policy makers and industry 
representatives ponder about possible capacity reduction as a way forward to adapt to reduced 
global demand (in contrast, for example, to the Japanese who combined massive state support 
with substantial reduction of capacity). The trade union was also strongly opposed to any 
reduction of capacity, as this would have implied lay-offs. The idea of converting some capacity 
to other production purposes, or to reduce the number of shipyards, both also often floated, was 
strongly rejected by the industry. Ivo Vrandečić, then still head of the industry body Jadranbrod, 
made that clear in a discussion with the metalworkers’ trade union in October 1976. Discussing 
the problems of shipbuilding, he maintained that “to fire workers is, to my mind, out of 
question.”98 Hence, there were only two possible ways forward for the Yugoslav shipbuilders: 
becoming less export oriented and/or finding new markets. 
In the second half of the 1970s, experts and policy-makers as well as people from the 
industry turned their attention mainly to the question of how to make Yugoslav shipping lines 
buy ships from Yugoslav shipyards. In the wake of the catastrophic slump on the world market 
and the ensuing glut in shipping capacity, Yugoslav shipbuilders and shipping-lines, together 
with government bodies managed to sign a so-called self-management agreement for that 
purpose in the Slovenian coastal town of Piran in June 1976. Its goal was to facilitate the 
production of ships for Yugoslav shipping companies by Yugoslav shipyards. Before that, as a 
representative of the metalworkers’ trade union had declared in February 1976, “support [for 
this solution] had been only orally”, without practical consequences – now there was a 
contract.99 
The so-called Piran Agreement would become a mantra that never materialized. It 
envisioned the building of sixty-two ships with 429,000 BRT, and a value of 7.7 billion Dinar, 
by Yugoslav shipyards for Yugoslav owners in the period 1976 to 1980.100 Its realization, 
though, was dependent on two conditions that themselves were not part of the agreement: the 
shipping companies demanded that someone – most likely the government – had to cover the 
difference between world market and domestic prices, since the latter were around 30 percent 
higher. The shipyards only promised to give a discount of two percent on their call price. The 
agreement also urged banks to cover 50 percent of the financing costs of the production of 
ships (the rest would be covered by the companies involved). A bit counter-intuitively, the 
shipping companies also demanded a reduction of the tariff on imported ships from 21 to 
 
98 “Zapisnik sa sjednice Republičkog odbora”, Split (Brodosplit), 16.10.1976, in: HDA, f. 1398, kn. 2 (1976), p. 10. 
99 “Program rada za 1976. godinu”, Zagreb, January 1976, in: HDA, f. 1398, kn., (1976), p. 10. 
100 For an analysis see also Palairet, “Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis”, p. 767. 
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9 percent because they would also in the future import ships.101 For Croatia, as both the major 
producer and user of ships, the cost difference that had to be covered was estimated at almost 
1.5 billion dinar, more than 860 million of which the government was supposed to pay. The 
municipalities where the shipyards were located were also called to provide money. In the 
case of Pula, the city was expected to give 15 million Dinar, mainly in form of tax rebates to 
Uljanik.102 
These financing conditions would prove to be the obstacle preventing the full, or even half 
implementation of the plan. The partners had made their calculation especially without the 
banks, which proved reluctant to foot the bill and never fully signed up. 103  The federal 
government as well appeared to be reluctant to come forward with significant help. While the 
program to build ships for domestic customers by domestic shipyards became the mantra of 
policy-making in this area, the reports from relevant authorities equally frequently stressed, 
“the Piran Agreement is not implemented as had been envisioned.”104 By mid-1978, only five 
out of an agreed number of forty-eight ships envisioned until that year were built. 
One of the difficulties was the unresolved question who would pay the price difference 
between ships sold to domestic and those to foreign customers. The Republic of Croatia did pay 
more than 850 million dinar to its shipbuilders between 1978 and 1981. In 1981 and 1982 alone, 
Uljanik received state subsidies to the amount of 254 million dinar – far more than the other 
large shipyards (on second place came Split with 148 million).105 The City of Pula paid its share 
as well. While Jadranbrod continued to complain about a lack of support by the government, 
the government accountants might have begged to differ because a substantial amount of 
taxpayer money was flowing into the shipyards – laying down a tradition that would survive 
into the 2000s. 
 
101 Information on the content of the Piran Agreement is available in “Rep. Sekr. za energetiku, industriju i 
zanatstvi; Rep. Sekr. za pomorstvo, saobračaj i veze: Informacija o sadašnjem stanju problematike gradnje brodova 
u domačim brodogradilištima, 24.3.1977”, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 88, br. 442. 
102 Radna grupa Republičkog sekr. za energetiku, industriju i zanatstvo/Republičkog sekr. za pomorstvo, saobraćaj i 
veze/“Jadranbrod”, 26.10.1977: “Informacija o provodjenju mjera iz ‘Platforme za rješenje problema brodogradnja 
i brodarstva’”, in: HDA, f. 280, Kut. 108, br. 979. The municipality followed through on its committments, as press 
reporting indicates (Vjesnik, 24 November 1977). 
103 Jadranbrod, letter to IVS: “Predmet: ‘Prijedlog ‚Društvenog dogovora o osiguravanju i usmjeravanju sredstava 
za plasman domaće opreme i brodova u zemlji’”, 16.12.1986, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 337, br. 618. 
104 Rep. Sekr. za energetiku, industriju i zanatstvo: “Informacija o realizaciji ‘Dogovora o osnovama Društvenog 
plana Jugoslavije za razvoj strojogradnje i brodogradnje u razdoblju od 1976. do 1980. godine’”, May 1978, HDA, 
f. 280, kut. 145. 
105 Jadranbrod: “Izvještaj o raspodjeli i upotrebi sredstava prikupljenih u razdoblju od 1.1. do 31.12.1982  
po osnovi obveza Republike preuzetih Platformom za rješenje problema brodogradnje i brodarstva”, 22.2.1983, 
in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 250, br. 272; Jadranbrod: “Izvještaj o rasprodjeli i upotrebi sredstava”, Zagreb, 23.2.1982, 
in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 232, br. 251. 
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Yet, the banks did not follow up. Therefore, the crisis could not be solved. The interested 
parties, such as Jadranbrod, the ship-owners, the Chamber of Commerce in Zagreb, and 
concerned government organs in Croatia even formed the informal “Platform for the Solution 
of the Problems of Shipbuilding and Shipping”. The platform continued to hold meetings, to 
produce white papers and to lobby the federal government. Yet, the problem with the 
commercial banks persisted. A 1983 analysis about the under-exploitation of capacity in 
shipbuilding stressed that the commercial banks did not give enough credit, nor had they signed 
the agreement between shipbuilders and ship-owners to support domestic production. Despite 
repeated calls by the Croatian Sabor, leading Croatian banks would not join the agreement, 
which is why eight billion dinars lacked for the domestic fleet renewal program.106 
In the course of the second half of the 1980s, when inflation constantly increased and the 
whole Yugoslav finance system got close to a complete meltdown, a more forthcoming 
response of the commercial banks could not be expected. Regional banks in Istria, Rijeka and 
Dalmatia who worked most closely with the shipyards, functioned almost as outlets of the 
shipyards. Already a 1979 report by Jadranbrod stressed that those few banks, which gave 
money to shipbuilding, such as Riječka banka and Istarska banka, faced almost depleted coffers 
so that they could not provide sufficient credit to shipbuilding.107 In the 1980s, when these 
banks faced increasing difficulties to re-finance themselves from the National Bank or from the 
government, their financial potency was further reduced. Because of their particularly high rate 
of export and the practice of getting payed in instalments, shipbuilders faced high demand for 
credit in hard currency, which was particularly challenging for ‘their’ banks. Shipyards 
sometimes used their own funds to finance their exports, risking illiquidity.108 Inland banks 
were anyway loath to engage with the shipbuilders, for understandable reasons given their 
frequent liquidity problems.109 Only fourteen out of 168 Yugoslav banks actually worked with 
shipbuilding and supported their exports.  
Taking loans abroad was no solution because it was not allowed to enterprises. The difficult 
credit situation in the 1980s was compounded by the gradual decline of Yugoslavia’s export 
finance bank, JUBMES, which less and less covered the needs left uncovered by commercial 
banks. JUBMES (Jugoslavenska banka za međunarodnu ekomosmku suradnju) had been 
established by federal law in 1978 as a specialized financial organization to support foreign 
 
106 Republički komitet za energetiku, industriju, rudarstvo i zanatstvo: “Informacija o problemima u poslovanju 
brodogradnje”, September 1983, in: HDA, f. 280, Kut. 263, br. 1181. 
107 Jadranbrod, letter to IVS: “Traženje povoljnije kreditne politike za brodogradnju u 1980. godini”, 11.12.1979, 
in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 181, br. 627–693. 
108 Jadranbrod, letter to IVS: “U skladu sa zaključcima”, 26.3.1987, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 366, br. 743. 
109 “Rekorder pred bankrotstvom”, Večernje novosti, 31 October 1987. 
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business of Yugoslav entities.110 Its main instruments was the refinancing of export credits by 
commercial banks, to the amount of 65 to 70 percent of their value. However, since its 
establishment the gap between the banks’ capabilities and the financing needs of Yugoslav 
exporters continued to grow, so that JUBMES could less and less meet their demand.111 In 
December 1982, for example, shipbuilding asked forty billion dinar export loans but JUBMES 
could provide only six billion.112 The state helped repeatedly by turning short-term liabilities of 
JUBMES into long-term credits, but such stopgap measures did not alter the structural problem: 
JUBMES did not have enough money, or sufficient drawing rights, to meet the demand from 
the export industries. Neither a stable co-financing arrangement with the commercial banks nor 
a sufficient source of funding for JUBMES were achieved.113 At the end of the 1980s, JUBMES 
was supposed to finance 80 percent of the price of exported capital goods, such as ships, the 
remaining 20 percent coming from commercial banks.114 Yet, the commercial banks failed to 
pay their share, and JUBMES lacked the resources for its own. 
At the same time, and almost miraculously, the shipyards continued to build ships. Some of 
these went to domestic customers, but the majority continued to be exported. In the second half 
of the 1970s, shipbuilding accounted for seven percent of Yugoslavia’s exports. 115  Only 
eighteen out of ninety-one ships launched by Yugoslav shipyards in the 1975–79 period went 
to domestic clients – less than four percent of the assembled tonnage. Uljanik is a good example: 
from 1975 to 1989, that is, during poor years on the global ship-market, Uljanik managed to 
deliver sixty-nine ships, of which only ten went to domestic customers (and these were 
relatively small vessels, of 16,000 to 19,000 dwt).116 One reason for continuous production, and 
the non-reduction of capacity, was the readiness of shipyards to sell ships cheaply, as long as 
the government was somehow able to foot the bill. At the depth of the global shipbuilding 
depression Uljanik accepted prices that hardly covered costs – and when inflation subsequently 
increased and the dinar lost value, they made a loss on each ship at the time of delivery.117 
 
110 For an analysis see Palairet, “Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis”, 783–4. 
111 “Nacrt zakona o pretvaranju kratkoročnih kredita danih Jugoslavenskoj banci za međunarodnu ekonomsku 
suradnju dugoročne kredite za namjene dopunskog kreditiranja izvoza opreme, brodova i izođenja investicijskih 
radova u inozemstvu” (AS-715), in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 329, br. 195. 
112 Skupština SFRJ AS Br. 137/1: “Nacrt zakona”, Dec. 1982, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 235, br. 1338. 
113 Mladen Rakelić: “Izvoz na kredit bez prave podrške”, Brodogradnje 34(3), 1986, p. 146. 
114 Jadranbrod: “INFORMACIJA o problemima u poslovanju brodogradnje i prijedlozi rješenja”, Zagreb, 20.3.1987, 
in: HDA; f. 280, kut. 366, br. 743. 
115 “Djelatnost koja svojom svestranom i dinamičnom aktivnošću snažno utječe na razvoj sveukupne jugoslovenske 
privrede”, Brodogradnje 28(1), 1980, p. 6; “Položaj brodogradnje u privrednom sistemu: Dugoročno dohodovno 
povezivanje”, Brodogradnje 28(1), 1980, p. 20. 
116 Markulinčić, Debeljuh, Uljanik 1856–2006, 57–8. 
117 “Stenografski zapisnik sa sajedničke (proširene) 10. sjednice”, 1.7.1980, in: HDA, f. 1398, kn. 6. 
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The government helped the shipyards to find new clients. A report by the Secretary of Energy, 
Industry and Trades of the Socialist Republic of Croatia from April 1977, for example, details 
the steps taken by the government and the Chamber of Commerce to land foreign contracts. 
Yugoslav trade delegations including a representative of Jadranbrod visited, and sometimes 
negotiated with potential clients, Algeria, France, Iran, Cuba, India, the USSR, Morocco, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Columbia, Egypt, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, the Gabon, Congo, the 
Solomon Islands, all countries of the Arab Peninsula, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in the 
mid-1970s. While only few contracts came out of these activities at a time when global 
shipbuilding hit its nadir, the Yugoslavs at least managed to keep a foothold in these markets 
and remind potential customers of their brand. 118  Western markets, however, remained 
practically closed since the mid-1970s, as these countries put up protectionist barriers and 
massively subsidized their own producers. 
At that time, the customer of last resort was 
not any of the Yugoslav shipping lines but the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets were relatively 
unaffected by the global recession of the 1970s 
and continued to increase their oil output and 
their foreign trade, for which they needed new 
ships for transport. Orders from the Soviet 
Union played an important role in keeping 
Uljanik and the other shipyards in Croatia 
afloat. Ships were delivered based on long-
term bilateral economic agreements between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.119 Uljanik 
delivered twelve ships to the Soviet Union (out 
of fifty-five deliveries in total) in the 1980s.120 
Uljanik workers even put in extra-hours to 
fulfill the so-called “Soviet Program”. One of 
its flagship ships was a railway ferry that 
carried 108 railcars; according to Uljanik’s 
director, Karlo Radolović, it was the largest 
such ship ever built anywhere.121 
 
118 Rep. Sekr. za energiju, industriju in zanatstvo: “Kronologija akcija oko nudjenja brodova za izvoz koje su povezane 
sa akcijama Jugoslovenske vlade i Republičkih Privrednih komora”, 24.4.1977, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 93, br. 569. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Markulinčić, Debeljuh, Uljanik 1856–2006, p. 58. 
121 “Prenosimo” [Interview with Karlo Radolović], Brodogradnje 34(3), 1986, p. 179. 
Source: Brodogradnje 34(3), 1986 
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There was just one problem: Uljanik (and the other shipbuilders serving the Soviet market) 
did hardly earn money with these contracts because the Soviets did not pay in hard currency, 
if they paid in money at all. Business with the Soviets was usually based on barter trade or on 
payments in non-convertible currency. This posed a serious financial burden on the shipyards: 
from their deliveries to the Soviets, they eventually earned dinars but they had to purchase 
many primary products that went into the ships from suppliers in the West who naturally were 
paid in hard currency. The head of Jadranbrod, Ivan Vrandečić, once said in a trade union 
meeting that even “a conjuror” could not earn money by doing business with the Soviets.122 
The Soviets were also conscious of their strong negotiating position because of the 
international recession in shipbuilding. In 1977, they insisted that in the future the full price 
of a vessel should be paid upon delivery, whereas previously 40 to 50 percent of the price 
was paid during the construction of the ship.123 This, of course, further increased the financing 
difficulties of the shipyards. 
Another problem was caused by Yugoslavia’s export support system: exporters received 
subsidies from the state, such as a refund of taxes and tariffs, only if they exported to the 
convertible currency area or to ‘Third World’ countries, but not to countries practicing clearing, 
such as the Soviet Union. From the late 1970s, there were near constant attempts by the Croatian 
government, pushed by its shipbuilders and the shipbuilding association Jadranbrod, to 
convince the federal government to extend export subsidies also for deliveries to COMECON 
countries, but to no avail.124 The Croatian delegates in the federal parliament were left to 
articulate their frustrations about the intransigency of the federal authorities, which saw this 
flatly as a Croatian only problem. They kept pointing out that shipbuilding was a crucial 
industry that employed (in 1976) almost 28,000 workers in Croatia, which was the second 
largest number for any industrial sector in the republic.125 
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Starring into the Abyss: the 1980s 
The 1980s continued in a similar way like the 1970s had ended: the shipbuilders lobbied 
the government for support, the Croatian government sought help from the federal 
government, the federal government hoped that things would fall in line by themselves; and 
at the same time, the structural problems of shipbuilding – such as those of other industries 
in Yugoslavia – went unaddressed. The involved organs continued to try to fulfill the Piran 
Agreement and indeed in the 1980s, more ships were constructed for domestic customers 
than in the previous two decades. Yet, the planned numbers as laid down in the Piran 
agreement were not met by a wide margin. 
The large shipbuilders continued to be heavily dependent on exports for employing their 
capacity, yet these export deals often were loss making. Uljanik, as one of the biggest loss 
makers, was always on the brink of illiquidity in the 1980s. At least three times, in 1980, 1981 
and again in 1987, its bank accounts were blocked for many months as it could not service its 
debts and liabilities. Uljanik, of course, suffered from the second oil crisis (1979–80), which 
led to another slump in the demand of ships, such as shipyards across the globe. These 
external difficulties were compounded by homemade shortcomings. The darkening clouds on 
the overall Yugoslav economy – rapidly rising inflation and an ensuing debt crisis, which 
brought the country to the brink of default by the late 1980s – did not help to improve the 
situation of shipbuilding, as an industry closely related to overall economic trends at home 
and abroad. 
The findings of a 1979 government report on the “economic situation and capacity 
exploitation problems of the shipyards” could have been repeated each year. It started, as 
usual, with the assessment that “shipbuilding is an industry of special and common interest 
for the whole of associated labor of our country”126 (an argument probably made by all other 
industries searching for government protection as well). The report highlighted that since 
1977, fifteen new ships for domestic customers could be contracted but forty-six for foreign 
ones, thirty-eight of them in developing countries. In terms of value, the newly concluded 
contracts with domestic clients were valued at 37 million dinar but 381 million dinar with 
foreign clients – so much for the intended reorientation towards the domestic market! Among 
the developing countries, the PR China was the most prolific customer (fifteen ships), 
followed by Nigeria (eight), Sudan (six), India and Liberia (four each), and one ship for 
Bangladesh between 1977 and 1979.  
 
126 VS: “Stanje, ekonomski položaj i problemi nezaposlenosti kapaciteta brodogradilišta”, June 1979, in: HDA, 
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As the report made clear shipbuilding produced a substantial share of Yugoslavia’s export 
earnings (6 percent) and even a fifth of Croatia’s. It employed more than 22,000 people and 
gave work to more than 4,000 sub-contractors.127 However, at a huge cost: the shipbuilders 
were loss making and projected further losses of more than 1 billion dinar in 1980 and a 
whopping 2.5 billion in 1981. The losses were so steep that the shipbuilding industry even 
could not work out a five-year development plan, as was required from all industries.128 
Uljanik worked at a loss as well – in 1980, almost half a billion dinar –, which they could 
cover only partially from their own resources. The losses at Uljanik were caused not only by 
the global crisis in demand for ships but also by insufficiencies in the organization of work 
between its individual OOURs. This led to delayed completion of orders, and subsequent 
penalty payments; lack of coordination also resulted in disadvantageous contracts for new 
constructions.129 
The crisis at Uljanik attracted national interest: the communist daily Borba for example 
published a very critical piece in 1979, highlighting organizational problems and mentioning 
rumors that director Bilić was about to resign.130 The national daily Politika stressed that the 
global depression in the demand for ships “only made all the weaknesses of unorganized self-
management relations visible” and that the Uljanik shipyard had organizationally not adapted 
to its reorientation from super-sized ships towards smaller vessels. The newspaper suggested 
that the managers of the shipyard should not run from responsibility by resigning, but finally 
take self-management classes.131 Uljanik was also criticized for its bloated administration, 
which – according to press reports – made up 40 percent of its staff while only 36 percent of 
employees worked in production. 132  The cooperation between OOURs was described as 
“insufficient” and “un-synchronized.”133 It appeared that the implementation of the 1974 and 
1976 organizational reforms had led to un-coordinated relations between the constitutive 
elements of the shipyard, to unclear responsibilities, and to a lack of forward planning, resulting 
in low productivity and high transaction costs. 
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In 1980, Uljanik’s deputy director Karlo Radolović was appointed new director, and he 
surrounded himself with a team of youngish managers. He took over at a difficult moment: 
in June 1980, Uljanik’s bank account with more than 473 million dinar was frozen because 
of outstanding liabilities of 900 million. A major reason for the dire financial state of the 
shipyard was the fact that for most ships contracted, the purchase price just covered the 
production expenses: all these ships had been contracted during the depth of the shipbuilding 
depression when shipyards had accepted almost any price. Some ships did not even have an 
owner because the initial customers had cancelled or had went out of business, so Uljanik 
built them completely on their own costs.134 The freeze of the bank account made the internal 
problems of Uljanik visible to the public and forced the local municipality and its party 
committee to tackle the issue.135 The local, regional and republic governments came forward 
with a 280 million dinar loan injection; two regional banks also provided support by making 
credit conditions more lenient. The devaluation of the dinar also helped Uljanik servicing its 
domestic liabilities.136 
Yet only a year later, in 1981, Uljanik’s bank accounts were frozen again because it could 
not service loans received from banks. Its liabilities now stood at some two billion dinars, more 
than half of it owed to Riječka banka in Rijeka; the bank itself faced difficulties because of 
Uljanik’s near default. It duly declined financing the four ships currently under construction, 
for which there was now a financing gap of more than 770 million dinar. On top of that, in June 
1981 Uljanik had liabilities in hard currency to the amount of more than 20 million US-$, which 
was not nothing for a Yugoslav enterprise at that time.137 One of the reasons why Uljanik and 
the other shipyards struggled to earn money was the international price war for ships. In order 
to remain competitive on the global scale, they had to accept below-production-cost prices 
because West European and Japanese shipyards were not only more productive but also enjoyed 
more subsidies from their governments. Eastern Bloc shipyards also undercut the Yugoslavs. 
Uljanik director Karlo Bilić in a 1979 interview with Borba complained, “not rarely, we build 
ships that don’t bring us any profits.”138 
This also affected the realization of the domestic program because for Yugoslav shipping 
lines, the opportunity costs of buying from domestic shipyards increased, as the world market 
prices for ships kept falling, while the Yugoslav ones increased because of the high level of 
inflation in the country. The shipbuilders could not roll on price increases of materials (e.g. of 
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steel) on their customers. Domestic ships were more than 30 percent more expensive than 
imported ones. Neither the government nor the Yugoslav banks were ultimately ready, or able, 
to fully finance this gap; the banks faced increasing constraints on refinancing given the dire 
state of Yugoslavia’s current account.139 On top of that, Slovenia and Montenegro even failed 
to live up to the committed purchases of domestic ships. These two maritime republics seemed 
to regard shipbuilding as a mainly Croatian problem, given the location of the shipyards. As a 
result, Yugoslav shipbuilding continued to be export-dependent at a time, when its international 
market position continued to worsen. Talks about a partial re-orientation of production to 
something other than ships never turned into a reality. 
Reports from Uljanik and from government authorities indicated that none of the 
mentioned problems was solved during the 1980s. Instead, the shipyard feverishly tried to 
find purchasers. Yet, exporting to the Soviets and to countries in the Third World was fraught 
with additional risks. In the early 1980s, for example, Uljanik delivered ten ships to Sudan 
and Liberia and was not paid in due time. Such delays in payment impeded its cash flow and 
thus threatened the construction of new ships, as their production was to be funded by the 
earnings from already delivered ships. In case of the Soviets, the Yugoslav shipbuilders had 
to accept barter as part of the payment. They did not barter directly, though, but through 
central bodies on the federal level responsible for the distribution of the in-kind exchange 
from abroad. So, from the 200,000 tons of steel sent by the Soviets annually in exchange for 
ships and other products from Yugoslavia, the shipbuilders got only a small share which 
satisfied just 8 percent of their total demand of steel.140 A 1979 government report had already 
stated, “so far, the export of ships to the USSR resulted in losses because no export stimuli 
came to application.”141 This continued in the 1980s, not least because the ship-makers 
needed to buy materials from Western suppliers with hard currency, while the earned only 
dinars (or less) from the trade with the Soviets. According to Palairet’s analysis newly built 
ships for the Soviets had as large an import component as ships delivered to convertible 
currency countries.142 
Nevertheless, in the pursuit of keeping capacity busy, the Yugoslavs agreed on another 
package with the Soviet Union that envisioned the delivery of eighty-eight ships between 1981 
and 1985. Uljanik director Karlo Radolović also endorsed the Soviet program and negotiated 
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with the Soviets in order to secure orders for his shipyard.143 One reason for this was the lack 
of progress on the domestic program. The most important Croatian banks still refused to sign 
the Self-Management Agreement on the Financing of Ships for Domestic Customers built by 
Domestic Shipyards. In 1983, there was, therefore, a hole of eight billion dinars in this program, 
despite repeated calls by the Sabor to the banks to support the deal. 
The orders from the Soviets and from developing countries nonetheless helped Uljanik to keep 
its capacity employed, and even to increase its workforce to more than 8,000 employees in 1986 
(from 6,500 at the end of 1980) – at a time when West European and Japanese shipyards reduced 
capacity. Uljanik and the other Yugoslav shipbuilders pursued a strategy to fill their order books 
in order to maintain high employment levels, “without proper regard to profit and loss.”144 A full 
order book became almost a goal in itself (another tradition that survived until recently). On basis 
of a full order book and many new launches, Uljanik’s director, Karlo Radolović boasted of a 
successful turn-around (“sanacija”) from near extinction to new flourishing in a 1986 newspaper 
interview. Export earnings were increased from 60–70 million US-$ per year to 200 million, and 
annual production to six ships.145 Radolović qualified the deliveries to the Soviets as a success 
and stressed that a time, when the international market was depressed, required creativity. Uljanik 
accepted, for example, special conditions for contracts with Sudan: they would train people from 
Sudan, “their whole fleet”, in Radolović’s words. 
Radolović also found a creative solution to the problem of clients forfeiting ordered sips: 
when in 1987 three ordered ships became owner-less because the intended purchasers went 
bankrupt, Uljanik decided to exploit these ships on their own, as nobody else wanted to buy 
them.146 This would earn them 200,000 to 300,000 US-$ per ship and year. Out of nothing the 
shipping line Uljanik plovidba was born (to the disappointment of the existing Yugoslav 
shipping lines that suffered from a lack of modern ships).147 
To his credit Radolović – characterized by Palairet as a “tough and able” manager –
implemented structural changes and cost-cutting measures as well. 148  The new director 
managed to bring order into the “Complex Organization of Associated Labor” named Uljanik 
by streamlining the twelve individual OOURs and implementing rationalization measures, so 
that nine ships per year could be built. He re-established central coordination and control by 
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making clear to the OOURs that in case they did not accept his decisions, they would have to 
find other customers for their products and services, which was of course nearly impossible.149 
Instead of five independent supply divisions (for each Work Organization), joint provision was 
established again. Radolović forced the workers’ council to accept overtime work and the 
cancellation of vacations in order to finish ships on time and avoid penalty payments. Such 
measures apparently led Uljanik out of is existential crisis and on to a new course of expansion: 
in November 1986, it was announced that the shipyard would add 1,250 workers over the 
forthcoming five years.150 The shipyard’s bosses claimed that in terms of productivity, Uljanik 
now was better than most of its European competitors. In general, the Yugoslav shipyards were 
said to be more efficient – measured in working hours spent for the production of 1 grt – than 
the South Korean ones, and even more than 50 percent more than the Italians. They lagged 
behind the industry leader, Japan, by around 30 percent, and the most productive West 
European producers by 10 to 25 percent.151 
The press was equally ebullient. Vjesnik ran a story in 1986 praising Uljanik’s export 
prowess and calling it not only the “leading Yugoslav”, but even “one of the most important 
global shipyards.”152 The shipyard was said to fully embrace the principle “export or die”, in 
view of the fact that “for years no satisfying solution for the construction of ships for domestic 
clients” had been found. The “internationalization of operations and the extension of activities 
from the national to the world market” are the fundament of Uljanik’s existence.153 Between 
1981 and 1985, 79 percent of all Uljanik produced ships went to foreign customers. For 1986, 
the launching of seven ships was planned of which only two would remain in the country.154 In 
January 1987, Glas Istre called Uljanik built ships the “Rolls Royce of shipbuilding.”155 Uljanik 
specialized in complex, purpose built ships, with flexible adaptations to the purchaser’s wishes. 
This earned it a good name in the world – on which it could capitalize until very recently – but 
it was not tantamount to earning money. 
By the mid-1980s, the whole of Yugoslav shipbuilding seemed to have withered the global 
crisis: while shipyards in other countries struggled and greatly cut capacity, the Yugoslavs in 
the early 1980s recorded an increase of orders. In terms of orders for new ships, they climbed 
to number three globally in 1986 (behind only Japan and South Korea), with orders for more 
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than one million dwt, priced at around one billion US-$.156 Almost six percent of the globally 
ordered tonnage stood in the order books of the Yugoslav producers. In terms of launches, 
Jadranbrod became the tenth largest producer of ships worldwide.157 In no other country but 
South Korea was the share of export of ships as high as in Yugoslavia. 58 percent of orders 
were for convertible currency markets, 35 percent for clearing markets and only 7 percent for 
domestic clients.158 Jadranbrod head Ivo Vrandečić, just before he was elected president of the 
federal parliament, boasted in a 1986 interview that in the preceding five-year plan period, 
Yugoslav shipbuilding “realized very good results and especially in the last two years achieved 
records in the production for export.”159 
However, the export ‘success’ was not necessarily a strength because it also meant an extremely 
high exposure to the vagaries of the global market, which at that time was clearly a buyers’ market. 
Aside from this, Yugoslavia’s rise in the share of orders was also due to the global decline of orders, 
thus, pointed more to relative than to absolute growth. In October 1986 global orders stood at 35 
million dwt while at their peak, at the beginning of 1975, they had been 205 million dwt, while the 
Yugoslav order declined ‘only’ by 50 percent.160 Yugoslav shipyards also signed contracts on 
“ruinous terms”, just to fill their order books.161 Industry specialists calculated that world market 
prices would have to increase by 15 to 20 percent so shipyards can break even.162 
Only ten months after Uljanik was proclaimed to be the Rolls Royce of shipbuilding, in October 
1987, the mood soured again: Glas Istre ran an article on “Shipbuilding in the ‘Bermuda Triangle’”, 
when the shipyard’s account experienced another freeze imposed by the banks.163 How was such a 
turn-around to the worse possible? As Michael Palairet has noted the “impression of a thriving 
industry was deceptive.”164  It appeared that the mentioned success was based on very shaky 
financial foundations. It took one important customer to default on its liabilities to Uljanik to reveal 
the lack of financial resilience and to push the shipyard again into deep financial distress. 
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This story started in 1983, when the Sudan Shipping Line failed to pay the full price for 
three ships from Uljanik (the same happened to 3rd of May, from which they had also 
commissioned ships).165 Sudan Shipping Line had ordered six freight container carriers from 
Uljanik and from 3rd of May in 1977. It was a well-known customer to them, that had started 
to buy ships from Yugoslavia already in 1960 and previously had paid them in due time. 
Now, payments for the second delivery of the ships ordered in 1977 were delayed. Uljanik 
and its Sudanese client negotiated the payment in four installments until 1982, but the 
Sudanese would not heed the arrangement and instead asked for a payment moratorium, 
which Uljanik refused. When it had transpired that the Sudanese would not pay, Uljanik and 
3rd of May wanted to stop the delivery. Yet, they were told by the government to go ahead 
because Sudan was a developing country, which Yugoslavia sought to support. Now, with 
50 million US-$ outstanding receivables, Uljanik asked JUBMES and the government to step 
in. After some round of negotiations in Belgrade, the Sudanese suggested to pay in kind – 
with cotton, to which the shipbuilders in general agreed. However, by 1987 they still had not 
seen any money from this barter trade and again asked for government intervention. One of 
the problems was the fact that Yugoslav cotton importers actually got their stuff from other 
sources, with whom they had already concluded contracts, so would not be able to turn 
additional cotton from Sudan into money. The “Sudan program” turned into the “Sudan 
problem”, commented Vjesnik.166 A delegate from the shipyard Split in the Assembly of 
Associated Labor in Croatia commented drily on the question whether such a business 
arrangement was beneficial for the country: 
“Of course it is, but only if you pay for it with a drastically lower standard for the workers in these 
enterprises, who also cannot be sure whether, at around the tenth of each month, they will receive 
their salary from the last month.”167 
International solidarity and an ambitious foreign policy, it appears, did not come for nothing. 
In the meantime, Uljanik (and 3rd of May) had run out of money and had their bank accounts 
blocked in 1987. Thus, the default of one customer on its bills “brought Uljanik and 3rd of May 
in a situation of total illiquidity so that they have no opportunity to continue their work.”168 
Financing the building of new ships was, as shown above, always on the edge, which is why 
the default even by one client could have severe consequences. The delay of new constructions 
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would make the hole even bigger because of penalties for delayed deliveries. Delays were not 
always caused by insufficiencies in Uljanik’s production process but also by late deliveries 
from domestic suppliers.169 The mechanisms for export support being increasingly in disarray, 
Uljanik and the other shipyards struggled to pay for the necessary inputs from abroad, which 
was another reason for frequent delays of deliveries. The shipyards complained, for example, 
that export subsidies and JUBMES loans were paid out too late. 170  Because of all these 
impediments, Yugoslav shipbuilders needed on average of 24 months to finish a ship, which 
industry specialists regarded as too long.171 
For Uljanik, the 1987 crisis and the freeze of its account for almost two years was a near-
death experience. From an extraordinary joint meeting of Pula’s  municipal council and the 
district party committee at the end of October 1987, it became known that the shipyard had 
substantial liabilities: almost 20 billion dinar in unpaid taxes and fees and more than 
130 billion dinar debts with banks; they also owned 52 million US-$ to foreign creditors and 
suppliers. The local newspaper called the shipyard a “Teetering Diva.”172 In a meeting on 
October 29, 1987, the City of Pula and the local SKJ organization called for urgent 
government help, in view of the shipyard’s 8,000 workers and 6,000 sub-contractors as well 
as “at least as many” employees in social services that were mainly funded by Uljanik. Since 
Uljanik could not make any payments, local social services faced a huge shortfall in 
revenues.173 Večernje novosti even asked whether the shipyard stood before bankruptcy.174 
Politicians and journalists struggled to explain how it was possible that a shipyard with full 
order books, which in 1986 was Yugoslavia’s record exporter with 200 million US-$ realized 
export earnings, could end up in such a dire situation. 
A few days later, on November 6, 1987, the parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia 
debated this issue. The head of Jadranbrod, Ivo Vrandečić, stressed again the high export incomes 
earned by the shipyards – but their success was put under question by illiquidity. Uljanik lacked 
43 billion dinar until the end of the year to keep its operation going and to unblock its bank 
account.175 The representatives of the shipyard put the primary responsibility for their illiquidity 
on external factors, such as currency risks, failing customers, and inconsistencies in Yugoslavia’s 
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Privredni vjesnik, 7 April 1986, p. 22. 
170 “Rasprava u Vijeću udruženog rada Sabora o aktualnim problemima poslovanja brodograđevne industrije u SR 
Hrvatskoj (5.11.1987): Podrška zahtjevima brodogradnje”, Brodogradnje 35(4–5), 1987, p. 163. 
171 Boris Dušić: “Mogućnosti plasmana proizvoda naše brodogradnje u svjetlu globalne tržišne situacije u svijetlu”, 
Brodogradnje 34(1), 1986, p. 81. 
172 “Blokirani navozi”, Glas Istre, no 253, 29 October 1987, p. 3. 
173 “Zabrinuta cijela Pula”, Večernji list, 30 October 1987. 
174 “Rekorder pred bankrotsvtom?”, Večernje novosti, 31 October 1987. 
175 “Nelikvidnost potapa brodogradnju”, Glas Istre, no 260, 6 November 1987, p. 3. 
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export support system. After months of handwringing, government support and depleting the last 
own resources allowed Uljanik to overcome temporary illiquidity again – but not to solve the 
underlying problems. Actually, the situation continued to get worse because there was no money 
for investments, as everything was spent on day-to-day survival. Director Radolović complained 
that there was “no investment in new technology or the improvement of technology, simply 
because there are no sources (…). We need to survive.”176 
It was therefore no surprise that Uljanik and most other Yugoslav shipbuilders operated at a 
loss, similar to their peers in the world. 1987 was the nadir of the international depression on the 
markets for ships.177 In the first half of 1987, the accumulated loss of the Yugoslav shipbuilders 
was 37 billion dinar, to which Uljanik contributed ten billion. Financing the construction of a ship 
became an ever more daunting task. Depending on the country where the buyer was located, the 
shipyards had to find 85 to 90 percent of the purchase price from banks or other sources of 
financing. With inflationary pressures raising and interest rates at more than 100 percent (in 1987), 
the financing costs skyrocketed and amounted to roughly half of the purchase price. Attempts by 
the Yugoslav National Bank to reign in the free granting of credits by the many commercial banks 
in Yugoslavia, because many of these loans were bad, only made finding credit more difficult. 
Calls by the shipbuilders that JUBMES should extend its credit lines went unheeded as well 
because JUBMES faced increasing re-financing difficulties. 
Another of the shipbuilders’ ideas was to change the accounting rules. Their argument was 
that they had to pay for the materials they needed for building a ship in the current year but 
would realize the earnings from this construction only two to three years later, which is why 
contracted ships should already be included in their annual income statement – it appears that 
Yugoslav accounting did not account for future receivables.178 An additional problem was 
currency risks. In the mid-1980s the US dollar lost value against other Western currencies, and 
the dinar lost value against both of them: from 1984 to 1985, the exchange rate of the dollar 
towards the dinar increased by 48 percent, that to the major West European currencies by 74 to 
90 percent. This worsened the balance of payment for the shipbuilders: they were paid – if at 
all – in dollars but had to buy many of the required materials in hard European currencies, 
usually German Mark, which had appreciated against the dollar. The price of supplies increases 
more than the price of ships. Depreciation of the dinar also affected interest payments as loans 
were based on the initial dollar price.179 
 
176 “Brod – za sve vremena”, Nedeljna Dalmacija, 8 February 1987. 
177 Palairet, “Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis”, p. 764. 
178 “Prijedlozi mjera za otklananje uzroka bitnog pogoršanja uvjeta poslovanja brodogradnje u 1987. godini”, in: 
HDA, f. 280, kut. 366, br. 743. 
179 “Prenosimo” [Interview with Karlo Radolović], p. 180. For a detailed analysis: Mladen Kmetić: “Zaostajanje 
američkog dolara u odnosu na valute zemalja Zapadne Evrope i inflaciju u zemlji ima za posljedicu sve 
nepovoljniji poslovni rezultat u brodogradnji”, Brodogradnje 34(4), p. 301–5.  
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In a word, the mess in which Uljanik and the other shipbuilders found themselves got 
messier by the year, and their proposals more desperate. From the responses – and non-
responses – of federal authorities to the requests by the shipbuilders and by the Croatian 
government on their behalf it transpires that the government in Belgrade usually processed 
them in a dilatory way. 180  That is, nothing was decided. Almost ritually, the federal 
government would refer to a comprehensive future solution that allegedly was in preparation. 
With deep frustration, Jadranbrod summarized the catastrophic situation for the Croatian 
government in October 1987: 
“Until today, no substantial measures were taken to stop the galloping growth of illiquidity of 
the shipyards, so that all shipyards have fallen under blockade, all payments have been stopped, 
all suppliers stopped deliveries and the shipyards are in a situation of complete cessation of 
production, even in danger not to be able to deliver those contracted ships due by the end of 
this year.”181 
It is hardly surprising that such assessments did not increase the readiness of commercial 
banks to lend to shipbuilding. In 1989, JUBMES sank into “moribundity” and tightening 
monetary policies by the federal government made access to credit even more difficult.182 In 
principle, the shipyards should have been in a better starting position than other enterprises 
that had been shielded from international competition, when the government introduced far-
reaching, liberalizing economic reforms in 1989.183 Yet, years of underinvestment would 
make it difficult for them to capitalize on this advantage. Uljanik entered post-socialism in a 
situation of deep crisis: they had plenty of work but little money, as the financial director 
complained in the fall of 1989.184 With no trustworthy export guarantees, after Yugoslavia’s 
export support finally had collapsed, the shipyard found it increasingly harder to find 
purchasers for their ships. What the Uljanik management and workers did not know yet, was 
that the 1990s would become even more difficult to survive than the 1980s. But at least hey 
had learnt how to muddle through. 
  
 
180 See for example SIV. Komisija za planiranje, tekuću ekonomsku i socijalnu politiku, 26.5.1987: “Izveštaj”, in: 
HDA, f. 280, kut. 366, br. 743. This Commission admits that most federal organs did not even bother to comment 
in time on the materials sent out by the SIV. 
181 Jadranbrod: “U svibnju tekuće godine”, 29.10.1987, in: HDA, f. 280, kut. 366, br. 743. Italics in the original. 
182 Palairet, “Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis”, p. 789. 
183 “Koliko koštaju zakoni po ‘hitnom’ postupku?”, Komunist, 30 June 1989. 
184 “Blokada, deblokada”, Uljanik, no 105–106, 15 September 1989, p. 11. 
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Conclusions 
The director of Uljanik, Karlo Radolović, and other leading representatives of Yugoslav 
shipbuilders never tired of complaining about the lack of appreciation of their industry by 
government and society. They quoted the high export earnings of their shipyards – omitting 
their losses, though. Radolović claimed that Uljanik gave much more to society than it received 
from it. While the world cherishes the value of Yugoslav shipbuilding, the domestic 
government fails to recognize its vital importance: 
“If we, in Pula, Split, Rijeka, and then in Zagreb and Belgrade would start believing in the 
shipbuilding industry, and would orient ourselves accordingly, everything would be much easier. 
There always have been problems, and there always will be; but their solution is much easier if 
one believes in what one is doing and why.”185 
He did not demand any special treatment by the government; only that “Yugoslavia needs 
to resolve its problem with exports and with the stimulation (propulzija) of the sector, and 
there won’t be any problems anymore.”186 Such claims show a business tendency at work 
that János Kornai has identified as being typical for economic systems with soft budget 
constraints: 
“The attention of the firm’s leaders is distracted from the shop floor and from the market to the 
offices of the bureaucracy where they may apply for help in case of financial trouble. (...) If, 
however, the budget constraint is oft such productive efforts are no longer imperative. Instead, 
the firm is likely to seek external assistance asking compensation for unfavorable external 
circumstances. The state is acting like an overall insurance company taking over all the moral 
hazards (...).”187 
Uljanik’s behavior, though, does not only confirm that the Yugoslav economy was 
typically ‘socialist’ in terms of the prevalence of soft budget constraints but it also points 
to the contradictions created by international integration. As the literature on the economy 
of Yugoslavia already has suggested, the country’s integration in the world market was 
always fraught with tensions. The friction worked both ways: exposure to the international 
market created tensions at home, and domestic contradictions impeded the smooth operating 
on the international market where the rules of demand and supply, and of capitalist 
 
185 “Brodogradnja zaslužuje povjerenje” (Interview with Karlo Radolović), Glas Istre, no 305, 31 December 1987/ 
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187 Kornai, “The Soft Budget Constraint”, p. 10. 
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ruthlessness – and not of self-management, or Brotherhood and Unity – were paramount. 
Vladimir Unkovski-Korica argued in his study of economic policy making in the 1950s and 
1960s that 
“the deeper the integration of the economy in the world market (…) the more directly the latter’s 
competition logic became expressed within Yugoslavia, and the more it caused friction on the 
shop-flor, bringing into question the legitimacy of the governing apparatus.”188 
The shift towards export-led growth in the early 1960s increased the “pressures on the 
system as a whole.”189 Yet, did the country really “eventually succumb to the competition logic 
dominant in global capitalism”, and did the export orientation “necessitate a different mode of 
organizing the workplace and the polity” as argued by Unkovski-Korica? 190  The case of 
shipbuilding at least suggests that tensions were produced both ways: decentralization and self-
managed socialism caused frictions for enterprises operating in the international market. 
Yugoslavia’s decision to enter the world market posed the question of the reorganization of its 
institutional structure as well as of its class relations. The country became increasingly 
dependent on integration into the global economy and on loans from the West. This ultimately 
proved corrosive for the Yugoslav system of self-management. Exposure to the world 
strengthened internal contradictions and made them more visible, while at the same time the 
government refused to give up its aim to build socialism. The domestic institutional set up and 
the incentives it created for economic actors did not correspond to what world market 
integration required. This reminds of Schierup’s assertion that because of the peculiarities of 
Yugoslav socialism, Yugoslav enterprises were in a “particularly unfavourable bargaining 
position” on the international scene.191 
The stakeholders in the Yugoslav shipbuilding industry did not ‘succumb’ to the 
competitive logic of the international market, on the contrary: against any business logic they 
kept expanding the industry, when global trends suggested to cut back on capacity. To 
paraphrase the perceptive Karlo Radolović: “Only in socialism is [the persistence of failing 
companies] possible because it is not known, how such a large organization can be 
liquidated.”192 Despite their constant complaints, Uljanik and the other shipbuilders operated 
under conditions of soft budgetary constraints and were repeatedly, in one way or the other, 
bailed out by the government. Their main purpose was not so much making a profit but 
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190 Ibid., p. 231–2. 
191 Schierup, Migration, socialism and the international division of labour, p. 169. 
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employing people, subsidizing vital – and not so vital – social services in Pula, and also 
earning hard currencies. Thanks to government support, Uljanik survived late socialism – but 
only just. 
The story of Uljanik in the 1970s and 1980s confirms a point made by Carl-Ulrik Schierup 
in his analysis of the connection between labor migration and institutional development. The 
1974 and 1976 reforms did not increase but reduced the role of market forces, and thus 
reversed a trend set by market-oriented economic reforms of the first half of the 1960s. They 
reinforced “bureaucratic conceptions” of economic development. “Market criteria for judging 
the success of plants and enterprises, or the level of workers’ wages, became increasingly 
irrelevant.” He also stresses, “informality and diffuseness of the bureaucratic control, which 
became especially obvious after 1974, gave the economy an extremely fragmented and 
arbitrary character.”193 This pattern helps to explain why the different layers of government 
were not able to formulate a concise strategy for the most export-exposed industry of the 
country, which suffered from a global depression not of its making. The reason was not a lack 
of knowledge – Yugoslavia possessed excellent shipbuilding experts, who knew about global 
developments, as becomes evident from the pages of the industry journal Brodogradnje; but 
there was a lack of political will and coordination. The decentralization had led to a system 
in which organizational units looked only after themselves, defining their interests in a narrow 
way and thus making it next to impossible to create legitimacy for systemic solutions. 
Muddling through was the best option available. 
Uljanik, and it peers, were exposed to international market conditions more than any other 
Yugoslav industry. For them, this was a source of pride – and a convenient argument to mobilize 
government support. However, Yugoslavia’s political economy and institutional mechanisms 
were not really set up in a way to help economic units adapting to the vicissitudes of the market. 
Firms such as Uljanik faced many other, not primarily economic expectations by powerful 
actors – such as securing employment and welfare and serving Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. 
Hence, the management had to navigate between very different rationales. It tried to achieve 
fundamentally incompatible goals. Schierup and Unkovsi-Korica are right when they stress the 
contentious nature of Yugoslavia’s economic integration into the world. However, Unkovsi-
Korica over-estimates the power of the international market to shape domestic relations. The 
shipyards and their workers suffered from a global depression in the products they produced. 
Yet, they also suffered from the political over-determination of business and the incoherence 
of decision making in the unwieldy self-management system that prevented enterprises to take 
restructuring measures in order to build long-term resilience. 
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Instead of unilinear causalities, a picture of ambiguity and hybridity emerges. This allowed 
space for individual ingenuity, as was the case when Uljanik, under Karlo Radolović, set out to 
specialize on purpose-built, customer-fit vessels that became known for their quality. Yet, these 
conditions did not produce systematic incentives to reward business reforms. The relevant 
stakeholders failed miserably in tackling underlying problems such as over-capacity, lack of 
credit financing, and insufficient protection from external shocks. Self-management’s in-built 
tendency towards strengthening local fragmentation widened the room of maneuver of 
institutional actors but also often limited it to ad-hoc and beggar-my-neighbor solutions. This 
was good enough for securing the survival of Uljanik and all the other major Yugoslav 
shipyards – something, many foreign shipyards could not claim – but at the price of forgoing 
innovation. Ultimately, it was taxpayers and politically less well-connected branches footing 
the bill – and they will be asked to do so in the forthcoming decades when the Croatian economy 
was presumably capitalist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pula. Bildquelle: Ulf Brunnbauer 
